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Efficiency, equity, and social rationality under uncertainty

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  • Kaname Miyagishima

    (Aoyama Gakuin University)

Abstract

In a simple model where agents’ monetary payoffs are uncertain, this paper examines the aggregation of subjective expected utility functions which are interpersonally noncomparable. A maximin social welfare criterion is derived from axioms of efficiency, ex post equity, and social rationality, combined with the independence of beliefs and risk preferences in riskless situations (Chambers and Echenique in Games Econ Behav 76:582–595, 2012). The criterion compares allocations by the values of the prospects composed of the statewise minimum payoffs evaluated by the certainty equivalents. Because of this construction, the criterion is egalitarian and risk averse.

Suggested Citation

  • Kaname Miyagishima, 2022. "Efficiency, equity, and social rationality under uncertainty," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 73(1), pages 237-255, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:73:y:2022:i:1:d:10.1007_s00199-020-01335-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01335-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Efficiency; Equity; Social rationality; Fair social ordering; Heterogeneous beliefs; Spurious unanimity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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