A Strong Incompatibility Between Efficiency and Equity in Non-Convex Economics
In allocation problems of perfectly divisible goods, we study the equity property of 'no-domination', according to which no agent can receive strictly more of all goods than any other agent. We prove that no-domination is incompatible with Pareto efficiency, as soon as preferences are allowed to be non-convex.
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|Date of creation:||1996|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: University of Rochester, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, Harkness 231 Rochester, New York 14627 U.S.A.|
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- Moulin, Herve & Thomson, William, 1988. "Can everyone benefit from growth? : Two difficulties," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 339-345, September.
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Oxford University Press, vol. 92(4), pages 671-687.
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