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Heuristic voting under the Alternative Vote: the efficiency of “sour grapes" behavior

Author

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  • Jean-François Laslier

    (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

Abstract

This theoretical paper contrasts two voting heuristics: overstating and replacing. Under the Alternative Vote, overstatement is inefficient but replacement is efficient. The paper argues that the "replacing" manipulation corresponds to a psychologically and politically plausible voter behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-François Laslier, 2015. "Heuristic voting under the Alternative Vote: the efficiency of “sour grapes" behavior," Working Papers halshs-01168670, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01168670
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01168670v1
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. James Green-Armytage, 2014. "Strategic voting and nomination," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(1), pages 111-138, January.
    2. Matías Núñez & Jean Laslier, 2014. "Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(2), pages 313-340, February.
    3. Jean-François Laslier, 2010. "In Silico Voting Experiments," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Jean-François Laslier & M. Remzi Sanver (ed.), Handbook on Approval Voting, chapter 0, pages 311-335, Springer.
    4. Dalton, P.S. & Ghosal, S. & Mani, A., 2011. "Poverty and Aspirations Failure," Other publications TiSEM 30b6aa68-cb90-42af-ba4d-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    5. Moulin, Herve, 1979. "Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(6), pages 1137-1151, November.
    6. Felsenthal, Dan S. & Tideman, Nicolaus, 2014. "Interacting double monotonicity failure with direction of impact under five voting methods," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 57-66.
    7. Karine Van der Straeten & Jean-François Laslier & Nicolas Sauger & André Blais, 2010. "Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 35(3), pages 435-472, September.
    8. Shmuel Nitzan, 1985. "The vulnerability of point-voting schemes to preference variation and strategic manipulation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 349-370, January.
    9. Pierre Favardin & Dominique Lepelley, 2006. "Some Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(3), pages 485-509, June.
    10. Patricio S. Dalton & Sayantan Ghosal & Anandi Mani, 2016. "Poverty and Aspirations Failure," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 126(590), pages 165-188, February.
    11. Lau, Richard R. & Redlawsk, David P., 1997. "Voting Correctly," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 91(3), pages 585-598, September.
    12. Bag, Parimal Kanti & Sabourian, Hamid & Winter, Eyal, 2009. "Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1278-1299, May.
    13. Jean-François Laslier & M. Remzi Sanver (ed.), 2010. "Handbook on Approval Voting," Studies in Choice and Welfare, Springer, number 978-3-642-02839-7, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. D. Marc Kilgour & Jean-Charles Grégoire & Angèle M. Foley, 2020. "The prevalence and consequences of ballot truncation in ranked-choice elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 184(1), pages 197-218, July.
    2. Igerseim, Herrade & Baujard, Antoinette & Laslier, Jean-François, 2016. "La question du vote. Expérimentations en laboratoire et In Situ," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 92(1-2), pages 151-189, Mars-Juin.
    3. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-01136390 is not listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Alternative vote; Manipulation; Behavioral voting;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

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