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Voting Correctly

Author

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  • Lau, Richard R.
  • Redlawsk, David P.

Abstract

The average voter falls far short of the prescriptions of classic democratic theory in terms of interest, knowledge, and participation in politics. We suggest a more realistic standard: Citizens fulfill their democratic duties if, most of the time, they vote “correctly.†Relying on an operationalization of correct voting based on fully informed interests, we present experimental data showing that, most of the time, people do indeed manage to vote correctly. We also show that voters' determinations of their correct vote choices can be predicted reasonably well with widely available survey data. We illustrate how this measure can be used to determine the proportion of the electorate voting correctly, which we calculate at about 75% for the five American presidential elections between 1972 and 1988. With a standard for correct vote decisions, political science can turn to exploring the factors that make it more likely that people will vote correctly.

Suggested Citation

  • Lau, Richard R. & Redlawsk, David P., 1997. "Voting Correctly," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 91(3), pages 585-598, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:91:y:1997:i:03:p:585-598_21
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jean-François Laslier, 2016. "Heuristic Voting Under the Alternative Vote: The Efficiency of “Sour Grapes” Behavior," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 57-76, August.
    2. Granić, Đura-Georg, 2017. "The problem of the divided majority: Preference aggregation under uncertainty," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 21-38.
    3. Lewis-Beck, Michael S. & Tien, Charles, 2008. "Forecasting presidential elections: When to change the model," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 227-236.
    4. Kim, Jaehoon & Fey, Mark, 2007. "The swing voter's curse with adversarial preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 236-252, July.
    5. Monika Bartkowska & Guido Tiemann, 2015. "The Impact of Economic Perceptions on Voting Behaviour in European Parliamentary Elections," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(2), pages 201-217, March.
    6. John Patty & Roberto Weber, 2007. "Letting the good times roll: A theory of voter inference and experimental evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(3), pages 293-310, March.
    7. Kevin Arceneaux & Robin Kolodny, 2009. "Educating the Least Informed: Group Endorsements in a Grassroots Campaign," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(4), pages 755-770, October.
    8. Meffert, Michael F. & Gschwend, Thomas, 2007. "Polls, Coalition Signals, and Strategic Voting: An Experimental Investigation of Perceptions and Effects," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 07-63, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
    9. Reed, Markum, 2015. "Social network influence on consistent choice," Journal of choice modelling, Elsevier, vol. 17(C), pages 28-38.
    10. Matthew L. Bergbower & Scott D. McClurg & Thomas Holbrook, 2015. "Presidential Campaign Spending and Correct Voting from 2000 to 2008," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1196-1213, November.
    11. Christenson, Dino P. & Goldfarb, Jillian L. & Kriner, Douglas L., 2017. "Costs, benefits, and the malleability of public support for “Fracking”," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 407-417.
    12. Alessandro Nai, 2015. "The Maze and the Mirror: Voting Correctly in Direct Democracy," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 96(2), pages 465-486, June.

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