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Heuristic Voting Under the Alternative Vote: The Efficiency of “Sour Grapes” Behavior

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  • Jean-François Laslier

    () (CNRS, Paris School of Economics)

Abstract

Abstract This theoretical paper contrasts two voting heuristics: overstating and replacing. Under the Alternative Vote, overstating is useless but the replacement heuristics is consequential. The paper argues that the “replacing” manipulation corresponds to a psychologically and politically plausible voter behavior, and study its effects. The conclusion is that the Alternative Vote should not be considered as immune to manipulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-François Laslier, 2016. "Heuristic Voting Under the Alternative Vote: The Efficiency of “Sour Grapes” Behavior," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 57-76, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:homoec:v:33:y:2016:i:1:d:10.1007_s41412-016-0001-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s41412-016-0001-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Moulin, Herve, 1979. "Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(6), pages 1137-1151, November.
    2. James Green-Armytage, 2014. "Strategic voting and nomination," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(1), pages 111-138, January.
    3. Shmuel Nitzan, 1985. "The vulnerability of point-voting schemes to preference variation and strategic manipulation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 349-370, January.
    4. Matías Núñez & Jean Laslier, 2014. "Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(2), pages 313-340, February.
    5. Jean-François Laslier, 2009. "In Silico Voting Experiments," Working Papers hal-00390376, HAL.
    6. Pierre Favardin & Dominique Lepelley, 2006. "Some Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(3), pages 485-509, June.
    7. Karine Van der Straeten & Jean-François Laslier & Nicolas Sauger & André Blais, 2010. "Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 35(3), pages 435-472, September.
    8. Bag, Parimal Kanti & Sabourian, Hamid & Winter, Eyal, 2009. "Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1278-1299, May.
    9. Felsenthal, Dan S. & Tideman, Nicolaus, 2014. "Interacting double monotonicity failure with direction of impact under five voting methods," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 57-66.
    10. Lau, Richard R. & Redlawsk, David P., 1997. "Voting Correctly," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 91(3), pages 585-598, September.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Alternative vote; Single transferable vote; Manipulation; Behavioral voting;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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