An extension of McGarvey’s theorem from the perspective of the plurality collective choice mechanism
No abstract is available for this item.
Volume (Year): 38 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/index.htm|
|Order Information:||Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Michel Le Breton & Guillaume Hollard, 1996.
"Logrolling and a McGarvey theorem for separable tournaments,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 451-455.
- Hollard, G. & Le Breton, M., 1995. "Logrolling and a McGarvey Theorem for Separable Tournaments," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 95a08, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
- James S. Weber, 2002. "How many voters are needed for paradoxes?," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 341-355.
- Saari, Donald G., 1989. "A dictionary for voting paradoxes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 443-475, August.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:38:y:2012:i:1:p:101-108. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn)or (Christopher F Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.