Democracy and the European Constitution: Majority Voting and Small Member States
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References listed on IDEAS
- Giandomenico Majone, 1996. "Temporal Consistency and Policy Credibility: Why Democracies Need Non-Majoritarian Institutions," EUI-RSCAS Working Papers 57, European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS).
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"An Empirical Example of the Condorcet Paradox of Voting in a Large Electorate,"
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- Widgrén, Mika, 1994. "The Relation Between Voting Power and Policy Impact in the European Union," CEPR Discussion Papers 1033, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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- repec:cup:apsrev:v:89:y:1995:i:01:p:137-144_09 is not listed on IDEAS
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Keywordsdemocracy; majority voting; European Convention; legitimacy; political science;
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