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Democracy and the European Constitution: Majority Voting and Small Member States


  • Johannes Pollak


The purpose of this article is to shed light on the relation between large and small member states with regard to the majority principle. Since Maastricht at the latest the institutional discussion centers around the question of how to devise a decision system which pays equal attention to the interests of small and large states in the European Union. This article challenges several underlying assumptions: that size is an important factor determining the political clout of a member state; the existence of ‘natural’ interest divergences and the competitive nature of the European politiy. Finally, it questions the intrinsic relation between majority voting and democracy.

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  • Johannes Pollak, 2004. "Democracy and the European Constitution: Majority Voting and Small Member States," The Constitutionalism Web-Papers p0019, University of Hamburg, Faculty for Economics and Social Sciences, Department of Social Sciences, Institute of Political Science.
  • Handle: RePEc:erp:conweb:p0019

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Giandomenico Majone, 1996. "Temporal Consistency and Policy Credibility: Why Democracies Need Non-Majoritarian Institutions," EUI-RSCAS Working Papers 57, European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS).
    2. Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, 2001. "An Empirical Example of the Condorcet Paradox of Voting in a Large Electorate," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(1-2), pages 135-145, April.
    3. Widgrén, Mika, 1994. "The Relation Between Voting Power and Policy Impact in the European Union," CEPR Discussion Papers 1033, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Amartya Sen, 1999. "The Possibility of Social Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 349-378, June.
    5. repec:cup:apsrev:v:89:y:1995:i:01:p:137-144_09 is not listed on IDEAS
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    democracy; majority voting; European Convention; legitimacy; political science;

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