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Majority Measures

Author

Listed:
  • Michel L. Balinski

    (X-DEP-ECO - Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique - X - École polytechnique)

  • Rida Laraki

    (X-DEP-ECO - Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique - X - École polytechnique)

Abstract

The validity of majority rule in an election with but two candidates—and of Condorcet consistency—is challenged. Axioms based on measures— paralleling those of K. O. May characterizing majority rule for two candidates that are based on comparisons—lead to another method. It is unique in agreeing with the majority rule when the electorate is "polarized" and meets R. A. Dahl's requirement that an apathetic majority not defeat an intense minority. It accommodates any number of candidates and avoids both the Condorcet and Arrow paradoxes.

Suggested Citation

  • Michel L. Balinski & Rida Laraki, 2015. "Majority Measures," Working Papers hal-01137173, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01137173
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01137173
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, 2001. "An Empirical Example of the Condorcet Paradox of Voting in a Large Electorate," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(1-2), pages 135-145, April.
    2. Sen, Amartya K, 1977. "On Weights and Measures: Informational Constraints in Social Welfare Analysis," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(7), pages 1539-1572, October.
    3. Michel Balinski & Rida Laraki, 2011. "Majority Judgment: Measuring, Ranking, and Electing," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262015137, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    measuring; ranking; electing; majority rule; Condorcet consistency; tyranny of majority; intensity problem; majority judgment; majoritygauge.;
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