Global and Regional Public Goods: A Prognosis for Collective Action
This paper applies modern concepts from the theory of public goods to indicate why progress has been made with respect to some global and regional public goods (for example, cutting sulphur emissions) but not with respect to others (for example, cutting greenhouse gases). Factors promoting collective action at the transnational level include the removal of uncertainty, a high share of nation-specific benefits, a limited number of essential participants and the presence of an influential leader nation. The impact of public good aggregation technologies on the future provision of transnational public goods is related to the trend in world-wide income inequality. Principles are presented for designing supranational structures for addressing transnational public good problems.
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| Length: | |
| Date of creation: | 01 Aug 1998 |
| Date of revision: | |
| Publication status: | Published in Fiscal Studies, August 1998, vol. 19 no. 3, pp. 221-247 |
| Handle: | RePEc:isu:genres:1225 |
| Contact details of provider: | Postal: Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070 Phone: +1 515.294.6741 Fax: +1 515.294.0221 Web page: http://www.econ.iastate.edu Email: More information through EDIRC
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