Global and regional public goods: a prognosis for collective action
This paper applies modern concepts from the theory of public goods to indicate why progress has been made with respect to some global and regional public goods (for example, cutting sulphur emissions) but not with respect to others (for example, cutting greenhouse gases). Factors promoting collective action at the transnational level include the removal of uncertainty, a high share of nation-specific benefits, a limited number of essential participants and the presence of an influential leader nation. The impact of public good aggregation technologies on the future provision of transnational public goods is related to the trend in world-wide income inequality. Principles are presented for designing supranational structures for addressing transnational public good problems.
Volume (Year): 19 (1998)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
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References listed on IDEAS
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