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Constitutional Rules

Author

Listed:
  • Francesco Giovannoni
  • Toke S. Aidt

Abstract

This paper proposes a normative theory of constitutional rules. We characterize the set of optimal constitutional rules under different assumptions about the degree of contractual imperfections. Our model explains why constitutions contain different types of rules. In particular, we derive conditions under which it is optimal, in addition to a standard decision rule (e.g., simple majority), to introduce veto rules (that block certain types of decisions) and supermajority rules (that allow the veto rule to be overruled). Our model also explains the existence of amendment rules and checks and balances

Suggested Citation

  • Francesco Giovannoni & Toke S. Aidt, 2004. "Constitutional Rules," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 540, Econometric Society.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecm:nasm04:540
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    File URL: http://repec.org/esNASM04/up.25897.1075585313.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Toke Aidt & Francesco Giovannoni, 2011. "Critical decisions and constitutional rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(2), pages 219-268, July.
    2. Guerriero, Carmine, 2006. "Dependent Controllers and Regulation Policies: Theory and Evidence," Privatisation Regulation Corporate Governance Working Papers 12204, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D - Microeconomics

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