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Bargaining one-dimensional policies and the efficiency of super majority rules

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Abstract

We consider negotiations selecting one-dimensional policies. Individuals have single-peaked preferences, and they are impatient. Decisions arise from a bargaining game with random proposers and (super) majority approval, ranging from the simple majority up to unanimity. The existence and uniqueness of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium is established, and its explicit characterization provided. We supply an explicit formula to determine the unique alternative that prevails, as impatience vanishes, for each majority. As an application, we examine the efficiency of majority rules. For symmetric distributions of peaks unanimity is the unanimously preferred majority rule. For asymmetric populations rules maximizing social surplus are characterized.

Suggested Citation

  • Clara Ponsatí & Daniel Cardona, 2008. "Bargaining one-dimensional policies and the efficiency of super majority rules," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 762.09, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    • Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:762.09
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    1. Daniel Cardona & Clara Ponsatí, 2014. "Super-Majorites, One-Dimensional Policies, and Social Surplus," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 16(6), pages 884-898, December.

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