The Optimal Majority with an Endogenous Status Quo
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Other versions of this item:
- Sam Bucovetsky, 2003. "The optimal majority with an endogenous status quo," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(1), pages 131-148, August.
References listed on IDEAS
- Mansoorian, Arman & Myers, Gordon M., 1993. "Attachment to home and efficient purchases of population in a fiscal externality economy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 117-132, August.
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- Scotchmer, Suzanne, 1986. "Local public goods in an equilibrium : How pecuniarv externalities matter," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 463-481, November.
- Brueckner, Jan K., 1983. "Property value maximization and public sector efficiency," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 1-15, July.
- Nerlove, Marc & Razin, Assaf & Sadka, Efraim, 1987. "Household and Economy," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 1, number 9780125157520 edited by Shell, Karl.
- Myers, Gordon M., 1990.
"Optimality, free mobility, and the regional authority in a federation,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 107-121, October.
- Myers & G.M., 1989. "Optimality, Free Mobility And The Regional Authority In Federation," Working Papers 10, John Deutsch Institute for the Study of Economic Policy.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Clara Ponsatí & Daniel Cardona, 2008.
"Bargaining one-dimensional policies and the efficiency of super majority rules,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
762.09, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Daniel Cardona & Clara Ponsatí, 2008. "Bargaining one-dimensional policies and the efficiency of super majority rules," Working Papers 375, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Cardona, Daniel & Ponsati, Clara, 2011. "Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in bargaining one-dimensional policies under (super) majority rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 65-75, September.
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