Environmental Preservation and Majority Decisions
In this paper we bring together the quasi-option value literature with a majority rule community decision-making scheme. It is shown that the quasi-option value is positive for a majority of voters if there exists a median voter who is dictatorial. However, the quasi-option value can be negative for a majority, or all community members, given the standard assumptions of the literature for which the quasi-option value for a single decision-maker would always be positive. But in some cases, this leads to majority decisions in favor of the irreversible development of natural resources when future information is taken into account.
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