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On Pendular Voting

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  • Hans Gersbach

Abstract

“Pendular Voting” presents a novel two-stage voting procedure: A randomly chosen citizen group votes on a proposal replacing the status quo. Depending on the outcome, a “counterproposal” ensues, that is closer to/further away from the status quo than the original proposal. All citizens vote pairwise on the status quo, initial proposal, and counterproposal (majority voting), the middle alternative being the default outcome in case of cyclical collective preferences. We analyze the process on a one-dimensional policy space, allowing for uncertainty about preference distribution. Manipulation may only occur in the first stage, without impacting the final outcome. Pendular Voting can engineer outcomes closer to the median voter’s preferences than standard procedures, even with selfish agenda setters.

Suggested Citation

  • Hans Gersbach, 2025. "On Pendular Voting," CESifo Working Paper Series 11783, CESifo.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11783
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1997. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(5), pages 1029-1058, September.
    2. Volker Britz & Hans Gersbach, 2020. "Information sharing in democratic mechanisms," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(2), pages 547-577, June.
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    5. Hans Gersbach & Akaki Mamageishvili & Oriol Tejada, 2017. "Assessment Voting in Large Electorates," Papers 1712.05470, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2018.
    6. Hans Gersbach, 1993. "Environmental Preservation and Majority Decisions," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 69(2), pages 147-155.
    7. Bruno Strulovici, 2010. "Learning While Voting: Determinants of Collective Experimentation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(3), pages 933-971, May.
    8. Felix J. Bierbrauer & Martin F. Hellwig, 2016. "Robustly Coalition-Proof Incentive Mechanisms for Public Good Provision are Voting Mechanisms and Vice Versa," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 83(4), pages 1440-1464.
    9. Gersbach, Hans & Mamageishvili, Akaki & Tejada, Oriol, 2021. "The effect of handicaps on turnout for large electorates with an application to assessment voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 195(C).
    10. Tsakas, Nikolas & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2023. "The last temptation: Is group-based voting resilient to pivotal considerations?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    11. Callander, Steven, 2008. "Majority rule when voters like to win," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 393-420, November.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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