IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/bdi/wptemi/td_1260_20.html

Demand for safety, risky loans: A model of securitization

Author

Listed:
  • Anatoli Segura

    (Banca d’Italia)

  • Alonso Villacorta

    (University of California Santa Cruz)

Abstract

We build a competitive equilibrium model of securitization in the presence of demand for safety by some investors. Securitization allows to create safe assets by pooling idiosyncratic risks from loan originators, leading to higher aggregate loan issuance. Yet, the distribution of loan risks out of their originators creates a moral hazard problem. An increase in the demand for safety leads to a securitization boom and riskier originated loans. When demand for safety is high, welfare is Pareto higher than in an economy with no securitization despite the origination of riskier loans. Aggregate lending expansions driven by demand for safety may, paradoxically, lead to riskier loan issuance than expansions driven by standard credit supply shocks.

Suggested Citation

  • Anatoli Segura & Alonso Villacorta, 2020. "Demand for safety, risky loans: A model of securitization," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1260, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    • Handle: RePEc:bdi:wptemi:td_1260_20
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/temi-discussione/2020/2020-1260/en_tema_1260.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Krishnamurthy, Arvind & Vissing-Jorgensen, Annette, 2015. "The impact of Treasury supply on financial sector lending and stability," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(3), pages 571-600.
    2. Repullo, Rafael, 2013. "Cyclical adjustment of capital requirements: A simple framework," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 608-626.
    3. Adriano A Rampini & S Viswanathan, 2019. "Financial Intermediary Capital," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 86(1), pages 413-455.
    4. repec:dau:papers:123456789/14127 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Arvind Krishnamurthy & Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012. "The Aggregate Demand for Treasury Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(2), pages 233-267.
    6. Fernando M. Duarte & Carlo Rosa, 2015. "The equity risk premium: a review of models," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue 2, pages 39-57.
    7. Gornall, Will & Strebulaev, Ilya A., 2018. "Financing as a supply chain: The capital structure of banks and borrowers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 129(3), pages 510-530.
    8. Gilles Chemla & Christopher A. Hennessy, 2014. "Skin in the Game and Moral Hazard," Post-Print hal-01457063, HAL.
    9. Jeremy C. Stein, 2012. "Monetary Policy as Financial Stability Regulation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 127(1), pages 57-95.
    10. Ashcraft, Adam B & Gooriah, Kunal & Kermani, Amir, 2019. "Does skin-in-the-game affect security performance?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(2), pages 333-354.
    11. Benjamin J. Keys & Tomasz Piskorski & Amit Seru & Vikrant Vig, 2012. "Mortgage Financing in the Housing Boom and Bust," NBER Chapters, in: Housing and the Financial Crisis, pages 143-204, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Allen, Franklin & Carletti, Elena & Marquez, Robert, 2015. "Deposits and bank capital structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(3), pages 601-619.
    13. Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 2013. "A Model of Shadow Banking," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 68(4), pages 1331-1363, August.
    14. Tobias Adrian & Hyun Song Shin, 2010. "The changing nature of financial intermediation and the financial crisis of 2007-09," Staff Reports 439, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    15. Elena Loutskina & Philip E. Strahan, 2011. "Informed and Uninformed Investment in Housing: The Downside of Diversification," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(5), pages 1447-1480.
    16. Elena Carletti & Roberto Marquez & Silvio Petriconi, 2018. "The redistributive effects of bank capital regulation," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 18102, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    17. Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2012. "Illiquid Banks, Financial Stability, and Interest Rate Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(3), pages 552-591.
    18. Tobias Adrian & Hyun Song Shin, 2010. "The Changing Nature of Financial Intermediation and the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 2(1), pages 603-618, September.
    19. Adrian, T. & Shin, H S., 2009. "The shadow banking system: implications for fi nancial regulation," Financial Stability Review, Banque de France, issue 13, pages 1-10, September.
    20. Ricardo J. Caballero & Emmanuel Farhi & Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, 2017. "The Safe Assets Shortage Conundrum," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 31(3), pages 29-46, Summer.
    21. Asim Ijaz Khwaja & Atif Mian, 2008. "Tracing the Impact of Bank Liquidity Shocks: Evidence from an Emerging Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1413-1442, September.
    22. Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, 1997. "Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and The Real Sector," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(3), pages 663-691.
    23. Alan Moreira & Alexi Savov, 2017. "The Macroeconomics of Shadow Banking," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 72(6), pages 2381-2432, December.
    24. David Martinez-Miera & Rafael Repullo, 2018. "Markets, Banks, and Shadow Banks," Working Papers wp2018_1811, CEMFI.
    25. Mary Amiti & David E. Weinstein, 2018. "How Much Do Idiosyncratic Bank Shocks Affect Investment? Evidence from Matched Bank-Firm Loan Data," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(2), pages 525-587.
    26. Christine Parlour & Guillaume Plantin, 2008. "Loan Sales and Relationship Banking," Post-Print hal-03415832, HAL.
    27. Emmanuel Farhi & Jean Tirole, 2012. "Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch, and Systemic Bailouts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(1), pages 60-93, February.
    28. Raghuram G. Rajan, 2006. "Has Finance Made the World Riskier?," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 12(4), pages 499-533, September.
    29. Bernanke, B.S., 2011. "International capital flows and the returns to safe assets in the United States 2003-2007," Financial Stability Review, Banque de France, issue 15, pages 13-26, February.
    30. DellʼAriccia, Giovanni & Laeven, Luc & Marquez, Robert, 2014. "Real interest rates, leverage, and bank risk-taking," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 65-99.
    31. Ricardo J. Caballero & Arvind Krishnamurthy, 2009. "Global Imbalances and Financial Fragility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(2), pages 584-588, May.
    32. Ashcraft, Adam B. & Schuermann, Til, 2008. "Understanding the Securitization of Subprime Mortgage Credit," Foundations and Trends(R) in Finance, now publishers, vol. 2(3), pages 191-309, June.
    33. Claudio BORIO & Piti DISYATAT, 2010. "Global Imbalances and the Financial Crisis: Reassessing the Role of International Finance," Asian Economic Policy Review, Japan Center for Economic Research, vol. 5(2), pages 198-216, December.
    34. Charles Calomiris & Joseph Mason, 2004. "Credit Card Securitization and Regulatory Arbitrage," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 26(1), pages 5-27, August.
    35. Hyun Song Shin, 2012. "Global Banking Glut and Loan Risk Premium," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 60(2), pages 155-192, July.
    36. Christine A. Parlour & Guillaume Plantin, 2008. "Loan Sales and Relationship Banking," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(3), pages 1291-1314, June.
    37. Gilles Chemla & Christopher A. Hennessy, 2014. "Skin in the Game and Moral Hazard," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 69(4), pages 1597-1641, August.
    38. Acharya, Viral V. & Schnabl, Philipp & Suarez, Gustavo, 2013. "Securitization without risk transfer," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(3), pages 515-536.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Martin Farias & Javier Suarez, 2025. "A Model of Interacting Banks and Money Market Funds," Working Papers wp2025_2508, CEMFI.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Segura, Anatoli & Villacorta, Alonso, 2023. "The paradox of safe asset creation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
    2. Nobel Prize Committee, 2022. "Financial Intermediation and the Economy," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2022-2, Nobel Prize Committee.
    3. Stijn Claessens & M Ayhan Kose, 2018. "Frontiers of macrofinancial linkages," BIS Papers, Bank for International Settlements, number 95.
    4. Marcin Kacperczyk & Christophe Pérignon & Guillaume Vuillemey, 2021. "The Private Production of Safe Assets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 76(2), pages 495-535, April.
    5. Neuhann, Daniel, 2016. "Macroeconomic effects of secondary market trading," ESRB Working Paper Series 25, European Systemic Risk Board.
    6. Segura, Anatoli & Zeng, Jing, 2020. "Off-balance sheet funding, voluntary support and investment efficiency," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 90-107.
    7. Becker, Christoph, 2021. "The liquidity mechanics of dealer banks in the market-based credit system," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 105(C).
    8. Neuhann, Daniel, 2017. "Macroeconomic effects of secondary market trading," Working Paper Series 2039, European Central Bank.
    9. Li, Rui & Li, Jianping & Zhu, Xiaoqian, 2025. "Downside belief disagreements and financial instability: Evidence from risk factor disclosures in U.S. financial institutions’ 10-K filings," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
    10. Castells-Jauregui, Madalen, 2025. "Private safe asset supply and financial instability," Research Bulletin, European Central Bank, vol. 131.
    11. Benedikt Ballensiefen & Angelo Ranaldo, 2023. "Safe Asset Carry Trade," The Review of Asset Pricing Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 13(2), pages 223-265.
    12. Albertazzi, Ugo & Barbiero, Francesca & Marqués-Ibáñez, David & Popov, Alexander & Rodriguez d’Acri, Costanza & Vlassopoulos, Thomas, 2020. "Monetary policy and bank stability: the analytical toolbox reviewed," Working Paper Series 2377, European Central Bank.
    13. Perotti, Enrico & Terovitis, Spyros, 2025. "Achieving safety: Personal, private, and public provision," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 224(C).
    14. Golec, Pascal & Perotti, Enrico, 2017. "Safe assets: a review," Working Paper Series 2035, European Central Bank.
    15. Chernenko, Sergey & Hanson, Samuel Gregory & Sunderam, Adi, 2014. "The Rise and Fall of Demand for Securitizations," Working Paper Series 2014-16, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
    16. Emmanuel Farhi & Jean Tirole, 2021. "Shadow Banking and the Four Pillars of Traditional Financial Intermediation [Securitization without Risk Transfer]," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(6), pages 2622-2653.
    17. Boot, Arnoud & Hoffmann, Peter & Laeven, Luc & Ratnovski, Lev, 2021. "Fintech: what’s old, what’s new?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 53(C).
    18. Nicolas Caramp, 2021. "Sowing the Seeds of Financial Crises: Endogenous Asset Creation and Adverse Selection," Working Papers 342, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    19. Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 2013. "A Model of Shadow Banking," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 68(4), pages 1331-1363, August.
    20. Ahn, Jung-Hyun & Breton, Régis, 2014. "Securitization, competition and monitoring," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 195-210.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bdi:wptemi:td_1260_20. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/bdigvit.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.