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The Rise and Fall of Demand for Securitizations

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  • Chernenko, Sergey

    (OH State University)

  • Hanson, Samuel Gregory

    (Harvard University)

  • Sunderam, Adi

    (Harvard University)

Abstract

Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and private-label mortgage-backed securities (MBS) backed by nonprime loans played a central role in the recent financial crisis. Little is known, however, about the underlying forces that drove investor demand for these securitizations. Using micro-data on insurers' and mutual funds' bond holdings, we find considerable heterogeneity in investor demand for securitizations in the pre-crisis period. We argue that both investor beliefs and incentives help to explain this variation in demand. By contrast, our data paints a more uniform picture of investor behavior in the crisis. Consistent with theories of optimal liquidation, investors largely traded in more liquid securities such as government-guaranteed MBS to meet their liquidity needs during the crisis.

Suggested Citation

  • Chernenko, Sergey & Hanson, Samuel Gregory & Sunderam, Adi, 2014. "The Rise and Fall of Demand for Securitizations," Working Paper Series 2014-16, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecl:ohidic:2014-16
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    Cited by:

    1. Efing, Matthias, 2015. "Arbitraging the Basel securitization framework: Evidence from German ABS investment," Discussion Papers 40/2015, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    2. Marco Di Maggio & Amir Kermani & Christopher Palmer, 2016. "How Quantitative Easing Works: Evidence on the Refinancing Channel," NBER Working Papers 22638, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Felipe S. Iachan & Plamen T. Nenov & Alp Simsek, 2015. "The Choice Channel of Financial Innovation," NBER Working Papers 21686, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors

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