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Neglected Risks, Financial Innovation, and Financial Fragility

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  • Nicola Gennaioli
  • Andrei Shleifer
  • Robert W. Vishny

Abstract

We present a standard model of financial innovation, in which intermediaries engineer securities with cash flows that investors seek, but modify two assumptions. First, investors (and possibly intermediaries) neglect certain unlikely risks. Second, investors demand securities with safe cash flows. Financial intermediaries cater to these preferences and beliefs by engineering securities perceived to be safe but exposed to neglected risks. Because the risks are neglected, security issuance is excessive. As investors eventually recognize these risks, they fly back to safety of traditional securities and markets become fragile, even without leverage, precisely because the volume of new claims is excessive.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 2010. "Neglected Risks, Financial Innovation, and Financial Fragility," NBER Working Papers 16068, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:16068
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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