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A Model of Endogenous Loan Quality and the Collapse of the Shadow Banking System

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  • Francesco Ferrante

Abstract

I develop a macroeconomic model in which banks can affect loan quality by exerting costly screening effort. Informational frictions limit the amount of external funds that banks can raise. In this framework I consider two types of financial intermediation, traditional banking and shadow banking. By pooling different loans, shadow banks achieve a higher endogenous leverage compared to traditional banks, increasing credit availability. However, shadow banks also make the financial sector more fragile, because of the lower quality of the loans they finance and because of their exposure to bank runs. In this setting unconventional monetary policy can reduce macroeconomic instability.

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  • Francesco Ferrante, 2018. "A Model of Endogenous Loan Quality and the Collapse of the Shadow Banking System," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 152-201, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmac:v:10:y:2018:i:4:p:152-201
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mac.20160118
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    Cited by:

    1. Gertler, M. & Kiyotaki, N. & Prestipino, A., 2016. "Wholesale Banking and Bank Runs in Macroeconomic Modeling of Financial Crises," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1345-1425, Elsevier.
    2. Fève, Patrick & Moura, Alban & Pierrard, Olivier, 2022. "The fall in shadow banking and the slow U.S. recovery," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
    3. Francesco Ferrante, 2015. "Risky Mortgages, Bank Leverage and Credit Policy," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2015-110, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    4. Federico Lubello & Abdelaziz Rouabah, 2019. "Capturing macroprudential regulation effectiveness: a DSGE approach with shadow intermediaries," Financial Stability Review, Banco de España, issue Autumn.
    5. Georgios Magkonis & Eun Young Oh & Shuonan Zhang, 2022. "On the Macroeconomic Effects of Shadow Banking Development," Working Papers in Economics & Finance 2022-06, University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth Business School, Economics and Finance Subject Group.
    6. Robert Kurtzman & David Zeke, 2020. "Misallocation Costs of Digging Deeper into the Central Bank Toolkit," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 38, pages 94-126, October.
    7. Hodula, Martin & Libich, Jan, 2023. "Has monetary policy fueled the rise in shadow banking?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 123(C).
    8. Federico Lubello & Abdelaziz Rouabah, 2019. "Capturing macroprudential regulation effectiveness: a DSGE approach with shadow intermediaries," Financial Stability Review, Banco de España, issue NOV.
    9. Wei, Xin & Liu, Xi & Zhang, Xueyong, 2022. "Shadow banking and the cross-section of stock returns," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    10. Poeschl, Johannes & Zhang, Xue, 2019. "Bank Capital Regulation and Endogenous Shadow Banking Crises," VfS Annual Conference 2019 (Leipzig): 30 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall - Democracy and Market Economy 203520, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    11. Chan Wang & Gang Yi, 2019. "Bank Runs and Business Cycles in a Small Open Economy," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 20(2), pages 847-865, November.
    12. Federico Lubello & Abdelaziz Rouabah, 2019. "Capturing macroprudential regulation effectiveness: a DSGE approach with shadow intermediaries," Revista de Estabilidad Financiera, Banco de España, issue NOV.
    13. Rottner, Matthias, 2022. "Financial crises and shadow banks: A quantitative analysis," Discussion Papers 15/2022, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    14. Gete, Pedro, 2018. "Lending standards and macroeconomic dynamics," Working Paper Series 2207, European Central Bank.
    15. Arsenii Mishin, 2023. "Dynamic Bank Capital Regulation in the Presence of Shadow Banks," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 51, pages 965-990, December.
    16. Federico Lubello & Abdelaziz Rouabah, 2017. "Capturing macroprudential regulation effectiveness: A DSGE approach with shadow intermediaries," BCL working papers 114, Central Bank of Luxembourg.
    17. Poeschl, Johannes & Zhang, Xue, 2018. "Bank Capital Regulation and Endogenous Shadow Banking Crises," MPRA Paper 92529, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Edoardo Rainone, 2021. "Identifying deposits' outflows in real-time," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1319, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    19. di Iasio, Giovanni & Kaufmann, Christoph & Wicknig, Florian, 2022. "Macroprudential regulation of investment funds," Working Paper Series 2695, European Central Bank.
    20. Ferrante, Francesco, 2019. "Risky lending, bank leverage and unconventional monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 100-127.
    21. Nandita Bhattacharjee & Ambika Prasad Pati, 2023. "Exploring Systemic Risk Measurement Issues in Shadow Banks: A Case of an Emerging Economy," South Asian Journal of Macroeconomics and Public Finance, , vol. 12(2), pages 186-217, December.
    22. Federico Lubello & Abdelaziz Rouabah, 2019. "Capturing macroprudential regulation effectiveness: a DSGE approach with shadow intermediaries," Revista de Estabilidad Financiera, Banco de España, issue Autumn.
    23. Lubello, Federico & Rouabah, Abdelaziz, 2024. "Securitization, shadow banking system and macroprudential regulation: A DSGE approach," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • L25 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Performance

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