Shadow Banking Regulation
Shadow banks conduct credit intermediation without direct, explicit access to public sources of liquidity and credit guarantees. Shadow banks contributed to the credit boom in the early 2000s and collapsed during the financial crisis of 2007–2009. We review the quickly growing literature on shadow banking and provide a conceptual framework of shadow banking regulation. Since the collapse, regulatory reform efforts have aimed at strengthening the stability of the shadow banking system. We review these reform efforts for shadow funding sources including asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP), tri-party repurchase agreements (repos), money market mutual funds (MMMFs), and securitization. Despite significant effort by lawmakers, regulators, and accountants, there has been uneven progress in achieving a more stable shadow banking system.
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Volume (Year): 4 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
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