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Shadow Banking and Bank Capital Regulation

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  • Guillaume Plantin

    (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Banks are subject to capital requirements because their privately optimal leverage is higher than the socially optimal one. This is in turn because banks fail to internalize all costs that their insolvency creates for agents who use their money-like liabilities to settle transactions. If banks can bypass capital regulation in an opaque shadow banking sector, it may be optimal to relax capital requirements so that liquidity dries up in the shadow banking sector. Tightening capital requirements may spur a surge in shadow banking activity that leads to an overall larger risk on the money-like liabilities of the formal and shadow banking institutions.

Suggested Citation

  • Guillaume Plantin, 2015. "Shadow Banking and Bank Capital Regulation," Post-Print hal-01168494, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01168494
    DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhu055
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01168494
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Shadow banking activity; Banking system; Banking crisis; Unregulated Banking;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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