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Fragility in money market funds: Sponsor support and regulation

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  • Parlatore, Cecilia

Abstract

Money market funds (MMFs), which are crucial to short-term funding markets, rely on voluntary support of fund sponsors to maintain stable share values. I develop a general equilibrium model of MMFs to study how sponsor support affects the industry’s fragility and regulation. Adverse asset-quality shocks lead MMFs to liquidate assets. When liquidity in asset markets is limited, asset prices are lower if more funds liquidate. Lower asset prices, in turn, make sponsor support costlier and even more liquidations occur. This feedback leads to complementarities in sponsors’ support decisions. Based on the model’s insights, I derive implications for the regulation of MMFs.

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  • Parlatore, Cecilia, 2016. "Fragility in money market funds: Sponsor support and regulation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(3), pages 595-623.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:121:y:2016:i:3:p:595-623
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.05.004
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    1. König, Philipp J. & Pothier, David, 2018. "Safe but fragile: Information acquisition, sponsor support and shadow bank runs," Discussion Papers 15/2018, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    2. Lóránth, Gyöngyi & Zeng, Jing & Segura, Anatoli, 2022. "Voluntary Support and Ring-Fencing in Cross-border Banks," CEPR Discussion Papers 16893, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Koenig, Philipp J. & Pothier, David, 2022. "Safe but fragile: Information acquisition, liquidity support and redemption runs," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    4. Igor Kravchuk, 2019. "Management of Investment Funds Financial Fragility," Montenegrin Journal of Economics, Economic Laboratory for Transition Research (ELIT), vol. 15(4), pages 17-32.
    5. La Spada, Gabriele, 2018. "Competition, reach for yield, and money market funds," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 129(1), pages 87-110.
    6. Andrea Ajello & Nina Boyarchenko & François Gourio & Andrea Tambalotti, 2022. "Financial Stability Considerations for Monetary Policy: Theoretical Mechanisms," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2022-005, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    7. Luck, Stephan & Schempp, Paul, 2023. "Inefficient liquidity creation," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 53(C).
    8. Segura, Anatoli & Zeng, Jing, 2020. "Off-balance sheet funding, voluntary support and investment efficiency," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 90-107.
    9. Ye Li & Simon Mayer & Simon Mayer, 2021. "Money Creation in Decentralized Finance: A Dynamic Model of Stablecoin and Crypto Shadow Banking," CESifo Working Paper Series 9260, CESifo.
    10. Majid Haghani Rizi & N. Kundan Kishor & Hardik A. Marfatia, 2019. "The dynamic relationship among the money market mutual funds, the commercial paper market, and the repo market," The European Journal of Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(5), pages 395-414, March.
    11. Roy Havemann, 2018. "Can creditor bail-in trigger contagion? The experience of an emerging market," Working Papers 755, Economic Research Southern Africa.
    12. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2016. "Risk Premium Shifts and Monetary Policy: A Coordination Approach," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Elías Albagli & Diego Saravia & Michael Woodford (ed.),Monetary Policy through Asset Markets: Lessons from Unconventional Measures and Implications for an Integrated World, edition 1, volume 24, chapter 5, pages 131-150, Central Bank of Chile.
    13. Gertler, M. & Kiyotaki, N. & Prestipino, A., 2016. "Wholesale Banking and Bank Runs in Macroeconomic Modeling of Financial Crises," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1345-1425, Elsevier.
    14. Loranth, Gyongyi & Segura, Anatoli & Zeng, Jing, 2022. "Voluntary Support and Ring-Fencing in Cross-border Banks," Working Paper Series 2688, European Central Bank.
    15. Ariah Klages-Mundt & Dominik Harz & Lewis Gudgeon & Jun-You Liu & Andreea Minca, 2020. "Stablecoins 2.0: Economic Foundations and Risk-based Models," Papers 2006.12388, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2020.
    16. Anatoli Segura, 2017. "Why did sponsor banks rescue their SIVs?," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1100, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    17. Lugo, Stefano, 2023. "Cost of monitoring and risk taking in the money market funds industry," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 53(C).
    18. Ariah Klages‐Mundt & Andreea Minca, 2022. "While stability lasts: A stochastic model of noncustodial stablecoins," Mathematical Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(4), pages 943-981, October.
    19. Kim, Hugh Hoikwang, 2020. "Information spillover of bailouts," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 43(C).
    20. Ivan, Miruna-Daniela & Banti, Chiara & Kellard, Neil, 2022. "Prime money market funds regulation, global liquidity, and the crude oil market," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
    21. Anatoli Segura, 2018. "Why Did Sponsor Banks Rescue Their SIVs? A Signaling Model of Rescues [Securitization without risk transfer]," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 22(2), pages 661-697.
    22. Linus Wilson, 2020. "Broken bucks: money funds that took taxpayer guarantees in 2008," Journal of Asset Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 21(5), pages 375-392, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fragility; Money market funds; Sponsor support; Regulation; Liquidity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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