IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fip/fedbqu/rpa12-3.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The stability of prime money market mutual funds: sponsor support from 2007 to 2011

Author

Listed:
  • Ken Anadu
  • Steffanie Brady
  • Nathaniel R. Cooper

Abstract

It is commonly noted that in the history of the Money Market Mutual Fund (MMMF) industry only two MMMFs have ?broken the buck,? or had the net asset value per share (NAV) at which they transact fall below $1. While this statement is true, it is useful to consider the role that non-contractual support has played in the maintenance of this strong track record. Such support, which has served to obscure the credit risk taken by these funds, has been a common occurrence over the history of MMMFs. This paper presents a detailed view of the non-contractual support provided to MMMFs by their sponsors during the recent financial crisis based on an in depth review of public MMMF annual SEC financial statement filings (form N-CSR) with fiscal year-end dates falling between 2007 and 2011. According to our conservative interpretation of this data, we find that at least 21 prime MMMFs would have broken the buck absent a single identified support instance during the most recent financial crisis. Further, we identify repeat instances of support (or significant outflows) for some MMMFs during this period such that a total of at least 31 prime MMMFs would have broken the buck when considering the entirety of support activity over the full period.

Suggested Citation

  • Ken Anadu & Steffanie Brady & Nathaniel R. Cooper, 2012. "The stability of prime money market mutual funds: sponsor support from 2007 to 2011," Supervisory Research and Analysis Working Papers RPA 12-3, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedbqu:rpa12-3
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.bostonfed.org/bankinfo/qau/wp/2012/qau1203.htm
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: http://www.bostonfed.org/bankinfo/qau/wp/2012/qau1203.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. König, Philipp J. & Pothier, David, 2018. "Safe but fragile: Information acquisition, sponsor support and shadow bank runs," Discussion Papers 15/2018, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    2. Timmermann, Allan & Wermers, Russ, 2014. "Runs on Money Market Funds," CEPR Discussion Papers 9906, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Lóránth, Gyöngyi & Zeng, Jing & Segura, Anatoli, 2022. "Voluntary Support and Ring-Fencing in Cross-border Banks," CEPR Discussion Papers 16893, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Anatoli Segura, 2017. "Why did sponsor banks rescue their SIVs?," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1100, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    5. Bulow, Jeremy & Klemperer, Paul, 2013. "Market-Based Bank Capital Regulation," Research Papers 2132, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    6. Huberto M. Ennis & Jeffrey M. Lacker & John A. Weinberg, 2023. "Money Market Fund Reform: Dealing with the Fundamental Problem," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 16(1), pages 1-14, January.
    7. Ronald McKinnon, 2013. "Hot Money Flows, Commodity Price Cycles and Financial Repression in the USA and China: The Consequences of Near-zero US Interest Rates," China & World Economy, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, vol. 21(4), pages 1-13, July.
    8. Eric S. Rosengren, 2014. "Our Financial Structures—Are They Prepared for Financial Instability?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 46(s1), pages 143-156, February.
    9. Marco Cipriani & Gabriele La Spada, 2020. "Sophisticated and Unsophisticated Runs," Staff Reports 956, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    10. Antoine Bouveret & Antoine Martin & Patrick E. McCabe, 2022. "Money Market Fund Vulnerabilities: A Global Perspective," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2022-012, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    11. La Spada, Gabriele, 2018. "Competition, reach for yield, and money market funds," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 129(1), pages 87-110.
    12. Stefan Jacewitz & Haluk Unal & Chengjun Wu, 2022. "Shadow Insurance? Money Market Fund Investors and Bank Sponsorship [Do global banks spread global imbalances? Asset-backed commercial paper during the financial crisis of 2007–09]," Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 414-456.
    13. McKinnon, Ronald & Liu, Zhao, 2013. "Hot Money Flows, Commodity Price Cycles, and Financial Repression in the US and the People’s Republic of China: The Consequences of Near Zero US Interest Rates," Working Papers on Regional Economic Integration 107, Asian Development Bank.
    14. Anatoli Segura, 2014. "Why did Sponsor Banks Rescue their SIVs? A Signaling Model of Rescues," Working Papers wp2014_1402, CEMFI.
    15. Office of Financial Research (ed.), 2013. "Asset Management and Financial Stability," Reports, Office of Financial Research, US Department of the Treasury, number 13-1.
    16. Lawrence Schmidt & Allan Timmermann & Russ Wermers, 2016. "Runs on Money Market Mutual Funds," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(9), pages 2625-2657, September.
    17. Sirio Aramonte & Andreas Schrimpf & Hyun Song Shin, 2023. "Non-bank financial intermediaries and financial stability," Chapters, in: Refet S. Gürkaynak & Jonathan H. Wright (ed.), Research Handbook of Financial Markets, chapter 7, pages 147-170, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    18. Parlatore, Cecilia, 2016. "Fragility in money market funds: Sponsor support and regulation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(3), pages 595-623.
    19. Joe Peek & Eric Rosengren, 2016. "Credit Supply Disruptions: From Credit Crunches to Financial Crisis," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 8(1), pages 81-95, October.
    20. Linus Wilson, 2020. "Broken bucks: money funds that took taxpayer guarantees in 2008," Journal of Asset Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 21(5), pages 375-392, September.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedbqu:rpa12-3. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Spozio (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/frbbous.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.