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- Paola Bongini & Laura Nieri, 2014. "Identifying and Regulating Systemically Important Financial Institutions," Economic Notes, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, vol. 43(1), pages 39-62, February.
More about this item
KeywordsSIFI; dynamic moral hazard; risk taking;
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-07-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2012-07-23 (Banking)
- NEP-CBA-2012-07-23 (Central Banking)
- NEP-CTA-2012-07-23 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-RMG-2012-07-23 (Risk Management)
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