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Dynamic Security Design


  • Biais, Bruno
  • Mariotti, Thomas
  • Plantin, Guillaume
  • Rochet, Jean-Charles


We analyse dynamic financial contracting under moral hazard. The ability to rely on future rewards relaxes the tension between incentive and participation constraints, relative to the static case. Managers are incited by the promise of future payments after several successes and the threat of liquidation after several failures. The more severe the moral hazard problem, the greater the liquidation risk. The optimal contract can be implemented by holding cash reserves and by issuing debt and equity. The firm is liquidated when it runs out of cash. Dividends are paid only when accumulated earnings reach a certain threshold. In the continuous time limit of the model, stocks follow a diffusion process, with a stochastic volatility that increases after price drops. In line with empirical findings, performance shocks induce long lasting changes in leverage.

Suggested Citation

  • Biais, Bruno & Mariotti, Thomas & Plantin, Guillaume & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 2004. "Dynamic Security Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 4753, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4753

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Keiichi Hori & Hiroshi Osano, 2013. "Managerial Incentives and the Role of Advisors in the Continuous-Time Agency Model," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 26(10), pages 2620-2647.
    2. Francisco Covas & Wouter J. Den Haan, 2012. "The Role of Debt and Equity Finance Over the Business Cycle," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 122(565), pages 1262-1286, December.
    3. Rampini, Adriano A. & Viswanathan, S., 2013. "Collateral and capital structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 466-492.
    4. Grochulski, Borys & Zhang, Yuzhe, 2011. "Optimal risk sharing and borrowing constraints in a continuous-time model with limited commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2356-2388.
    5. Johannes Hörner & Larry Samuelson, 2013. "Incentives for experimenting agents," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(4), pages 632-663, December.
    6. Anderson, Ronald W. & Bustamante, Maria Cecilia & Guibaud, Stéphane, 2012. "Agency, firm growth, and managerial turnover," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 43144, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    7. Xavier Freixas & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2012. "Taming SIFIs," Working Papers 649, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    8. repec:eee:jbfina:v:82:y:2017:i:c:p:40-58 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Vo Thi Quynh Anh, 2009. "Optimality of prompt corrective action in a continuous - time model with recapitalization possibility," Working Paper 2009/28, Norges Bank.
    10. Gerardi, Dino & Maestri, Lucas, 2012. "A principal-agent model of sequential testing," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
    11. repec:eee:jetheo:v:169:y:2017:i:c:p:270-293 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix & Tomasz Sadzik & Yuliy Sannikov, 2009. "Dynamic Incentive Accounts," NBER Working Papers 15324, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Henri Pages & Dylan Possamaï, 2014. "A mathematical treatment of bank monitoring incentives," Finance and Stochastics, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 39-73, January.
    14. Edmans, Alex & Gabaix, Xavier, 2010. "Risk and the CEO Market: Why Do Some Large Firms Hire Highly-Paid, Low-Talent CEOs?," CEPR Discussion Papers 7836, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    15. repec:cwl:cwldpp:1726rr is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Jean-Charles Rochet & Stéphane Villeneuve, 2005. "Corporate portfolio management," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 225-243, August.
    17. Dang, Viet Anh, 2010. "Optimal financial contracts with hidden effort, unobservable profits and endogenous costs of effort," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 75-89, February.

    More about this item


    asset pricing; Dynamic Financial Contracting; moral hazard; security design;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy

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