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Collateral and Capital Structure

  • S. Viswanathan

    (Duke University)

  • Adriano Rampini

    (Duke University)

This paper develops a dynamic model of the capital structure based on the need to collateralize loans with tangible assets. The model provides a unified theory of optimal firm financing in terms of the optimal capital structure, investment, leasing, and risk management policy. Tangible assets are a key determinant of the cross section and dynamic behavior of the capital structure. Firms with low tangible capital are constrained longer, lease more of their physical capital, and borrow less. Leasing of tangible assets enables faster firm growth. The model helps explain the “zero debt puzzle” as well as other stylized facts about the capital structure. For risk management the model implies that incomplete hedging of net worth is optimal.

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File URL: https://www.economicdynamics.org/meetpapers/2009/paper_525.pdf
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Paper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2009 Meeting Papers with number 525.

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Date of creation: 2009
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Handle: RePEc:red:sed009:525
Contact details of provider: Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Christian Zimmermann Economic Research Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis PO Box 442 St. Louis MO 63166-0442 USA
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Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/society.htm
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