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Optimality of prompt corrective action in a continuous - time model with recapitalization possibility

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  • Vo Thi Quynh Anh

    (Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway))

Abstract

Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) is a system of predetermined capital/asset ratios that trigger supervisory actions by a banking regulator. Our paper addresses the optimality of this regulation system by dapting a dynamic model of entrepreneurial finance to banking regulation. In a dynamic moral hazard setting, we first derive the optimal contract between the banker and the regulator and then implement it by a menu of regulatory tools. Our main findings are the following: first, the insurance premium is a risk-based premium where the risk is measured by the capital level; second, our model implies a capital regulation system that shares several similarities with the US PCA. According to our proposed system, regulatory supervision should be realized in the spirit of gradual intervention and the book-value of capital is used as information to trigger intervention. Banks with high capital are not subject to any restrictions. Dividend distribution is prohibited in banks with intermediate level of capital. When banks have low capital level, a plan of recapitalization is required and in the worst case, banks are placed in liquidation.

Suggested Citation

  • Vo Thi Quynh Anh, 2009. "Optimality of prompt corrective action in a continuous - time model with recapitalization possibility," Working Paper 2009/28, Norges Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:bno:worpap:2009_28
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    File URL: http://www.norges-bank.no/en/Published/Papers/Working-Papers/2009/WP-200928/
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Xavier Freixas & Bruno Maria Parigi, 2007. "Banking Regulation and Prompt Corrective Action," CESifo Working Paper Series 2136, CESifo Group Munich.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Prompt Corrective Action; Capital Regulation; Dynamic Contracting; Recapitalization;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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