Learning, Termination, and Payout Policy in Dynamic Incentive Contracts
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- DeMarzo, Peter M. & Sannikov, Yuliy, 2016. "Learning, Termination, and Payout Policy in Dynamic Incentive Contracts," Research Papers 3432, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Markus K. Brunnermeier & Yuliy Sannikov, 2016.
"Macro, Money and Finance: A Continuous Time Approach,"
NBER Working Papers
22343, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Brunnermeier, Markus K & Sannikov, Yuliy, 2016. "Macro, Money and Finance: A Continuous Time Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 11329, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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- repec:eee:macchp:v2-1497 is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
KeywordsReal options; inside information; moral hazard; dynamic contracts; payout policy; information rents;
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
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