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Competitive Equilibria With Limited Enforcement

  • Patrick J. Kehoe
  • Fabrizio Perri

This study demonstrates how constrained efficient allocations can arise endogenously as equilibria in an economy with a limited ability to enforce contracts and with private agents behaving competitively, taking a set of taxes as given. The taxes in this economy limit risk-sharing and arise in an equilibrium of a dynamic game between governments of sovereign nations. The equilibrium allocations depend on governments choosing to tax both the repayment of international debt and the income from capital investment in their countries.

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File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w9077.pdf
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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 9077.

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Date of creation: Jul 2002
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Publication status: published as Kehoe, Patrick J. and Fabrizio Perri. "Competitive Equilibria With Limited Enforcement," Journal of Economic Theory, 2004, v119(1,Nov), 184-206.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9077
Note: EFG
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  1. repec:oup:restud:v:60:y:1993:i:4:p:865-88 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. repec:oup:restud:v:69:y:2002:i:1:p:209-44 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Marianne Baxter & Mario J. Crucini, 1994. "Business Cycles and the Asset Structure of Foreign Trade," NBER Working Papers 4975, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Kenneth M. Kletzer & Brian D. Wright, 2000. "Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter," International Finance 0003004, EconWPA.
  5. Patrick J. Kehoe & Fabrizio Perri, 2002. "International Business Cycles with Endogenous Incomplete Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(3), pages 907-928, May.
  6. Timothy J Kehoe & David K Levine, 1993. "Debt Constrained Asset Markets," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1276, David K. Levine.
  7. Chari, V V & Kehoe, Patrick J, 1990. "Sustainable Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(4), pages 783-802, August.
  8. Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-96, March.
  9. Juha Seppala, 2000. "Asset Prices And Business Cycles Under Limited Commitment," Computing in Economics and Finance 2000 319, Society for Computational Economics.
  10. Mark L. J. Wright, 2004. "Private capital flows, capital controls, and default risk," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Jun.
  11. Backus, David K & Kehoe, Patrick J & Kydland, Finn E, 1992. "International Real Business Cycles," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 745-75, August.
  12. V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1993. "Sustainable Plans and Mutual Default," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 60(1), pages 175-195.
  13. Kehoe, Timothy J & Levine, David K, 2001. "Liquidity Constrained Markets versus Debt Constrained Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(3), pages 575-98, May.
  14. Attanasio, Orazio & Rios-Rull, Jose-Victor, 2000. "Consumption smoothing in island economies: Can public insurance reduce welfare?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(7), pages 1225-1258, June.
  15. Karsten Jeske, 2005. "Private international debt with risk of repudiation," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2001-16, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
  16. repec:oup:restud:v:60:y:1993:i:1:p:175-95 is not listed on IDEAS
  17. repec:oup:restud:v:63:y:1996:i:4:p:595-609 is not listed on IDEAS
  18. repec:oup:restud:v:48:y:1981:i:2:p:289-309 is not listed on IDEAS
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