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Asset Prices And Business Cycles Under Limited Commitment

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  • Juha Seppala

    (University of Chicago)

Abstract

This paper presents a business-cycle model with heterogeneous agents that have access to complete markets but face endogenous borrowing and savings constraints. These constraints are motivated by the agents' limited commitment technology. In this environment, aggregate fluctuations are close to the ones generated by Pareto Optimal (full commitment) risk-sharing arrangements. However, endogenous borrowing and savings constraints force agents to underinvest in capital and increase the volatilities of both the stochastic discount factor and the price of equity. The mechanism explains simultaneously both high average returns on equity and low average returns on bonds. This is accomplished in the economy with relatively small exogenous shocks and a high degree of patience, and a low degree of risk-aversion on the part of the agents. Previous work on limited commitment has concentrated on endowment economies and has emphasized borrowing constraints. Numerical results in this paper suggest that when capital is added to such models, savings constraints play even more central role.

Suggested Citation

  • Juha Seppala, 2000. "Asset Prices And Business Cycles Under Limited Commitment," Computing in Economics and Finance 2000 319, Society for Computational Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:sce:scecf0:319
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    Cited by:

    1. Kehoe, Patrick J. & Perri, Fabrizio, 2004. "Competitive equilibria with limited enforcement," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 119(1), pages 184-206, November.
    2. Yili Chien & Junsang Lee, 2006. "Why Tax Capital?," 2006 Meeting Papers 492, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    3. YiLi Chien & JunSang Lee, 2006. "Optimal Capital Taxation under Limited Commitment," 2006 Meeting Papers 430, Society for Economic Dynamics.

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