The Financial and Macroeconomic Implications of Banking Frictions and Banking Riskiness
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More about this item
Keywords
Banking riskiness shocks; two-sided debt contract; default effects; risk effects; financial crisis.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
- E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BAN-2011-07-13 (Banking)
- NEP-CBA-2011-07-13 (Central Banking)
- NEP-MAC-2011-07-13 (Macroeconomics)
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