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The optimal size of a bank: Costs and benefits of diversification

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  • Cerasi, Vittoria
  • Daltung, Sonja

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  • Cerasi, Vittoria & Daltung, Sonja, 2000. "The optimal size of a bank: Costs and benefits of diversification," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(9), pages 1701-1726, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:44:y:2000:i:9:p:1701-1726
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    5. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicholas S., 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 187-221, June.
    6. Lummer, Scott L. & McConnell, John J., 1989. "Further evidence on the bank lending process and the capital-market response to bank loan agreements," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 99-122, November.
    7. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-29, February.
    8. Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, 1997. "Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and The Real Sector," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(3), pages 663-691.
    9. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
    10. Besanko, David & Kanatas, George, 1993. "Credit Market Equilibrium with Bank Monitoring and Moral Hazard," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 6(1), pages 213-232.
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    15. Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
    16. Rochet, Jean-Charles & Tirole, Jean, 1996. "Interbank Lending and Systemic Risk," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 28(4), pages 733-762, November.
    17. Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, 1994. "The prudential regulation of banks," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9539, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    18. Mike Burkart & Denis Gromb & Fausto Panunzi, 1997. "Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(3), pages 693-728.
    19. Cerasi, Vittoria & Daltung, Sonja, 1998. "Close relationships between banks and firms: is it good or bad?," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 233-253, September.
    20. Jeffrey A. Clark, 1988. "Economies of scale and scope at depository financial institutions: a review of the literature," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, vol. 73(Sep), pages 16-33.
    21. Yafeh, Y. & Yosha, O., 1995. "Large Shareholders and Banks: Who Monitors and How," Papers 04-95, Tel Aviv.
    22. Yafeh, Yishay & Yosha, Oved, 1995. "Large Shareholders and Banks: Who Monitors and How?," CEPR Discussion Papers 1178, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    23. V. Cerasi & S. Daltung, 1995. "The Optimal Size of a Bank: Costs and Benefits of Diversification," Departmental Working Papers 1995-05, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
    24. Winton Andrew, 1995. "Delegated Monitoring and Bank Structure in a Finite Economy," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 158-187, April.
    25. V. Cerasi & S. Daltung, 1998. "Close-Relationships between Banks and Firms: Is it Good or Bad?," Departmental Working Papers 1998-01, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
    26. Krasa, Stefan & Villamil, Anne P., 1992. "Monitoring the monitor: An incentive structure for a financial intermediary," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 197-221.
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