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What’s Common to Relationship Banking and Relationship Investing? Reflections within the Contractual Theory of the Firm

  • Doris Neuberger

    (University of Rostock)

Registered author(s):

    The financial systems in continental Europe are moving from bank intermediation to intermediation by non-bank institutional investors. The present paper examines to what extent this implies a substitution of relationship finance by arm’s length finance or just of one form of relationship finance by another. Within the contractual theory of the firm, we seek common features of relationship banking and relationship investing. Extending the governance structure approach, we show that both are hybrid governance forms, whose comparative advantages depend on two kinds of asset specificity. They are complements rather than substitutes to finance and control firms with different redeployability and information opaqueness of assets.

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    File URL: http://econwpa.repec.org/eps/fin/papers/0503/0503001.pdf
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    Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Finance with number 0503001.

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    Length: 34 pages
    Date of creation: 02 Mar 2005
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpfi:0503001
    Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 34
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://econwpa.repec.org

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