Négociation collective et théorie des jeux : le rôle du temps dans la littérature récente
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References listed on IDEAS
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
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