Deadline Effects in Ultimatum Bargaining: An Experimental Study of Concession Sniping with Low or no Costs of Delay
In this paper we report an experimental study of the ultimatum game in which subjects bargain for constant and slowly decreasing pies, over 3 and 11 rounds with either constant or alternating offers. With decreasing pies efficiency requires early agreements, whereas constant pies allow for late efficiency. Slowly decreasing pies are here captured by a 10%-decrease of total rewards from the first to the last round. While in the alternating offer bargaining mode roles are exchanged from round to round, in the constant role mode the same party is constantly proposing. Participants play all games with changing partners but keep their role as (initial) proposer or responder over the entire experiment. Our findings offer institutional advice, e.g. that conflict can be avoided by role alternation and time pressure.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2001|
|Date of revision:|
|Note:||This paper is part of the EU-TMR Research Network ENDEAR (FMRX-CT98-0238). We are indebted to Ben Greiner, Sylvia Schikora, and Volker Zieman for their research assistance.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +49-3641-68 65
Fax: +49-3641-68 69 90
Web page: http://www.econ.mpg.de/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Web: http://www.econ.mpg.de/english/research/ESI/discuss.php Email: |
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2010.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
- Guth, Werner & Tietz, Reinhard, 1990. "Ultimatum bargaining behavior : A survey and comparison of experimental results," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 417-449, September.
- Harsanyi, John C, 1995.
"Games with Incomplete Information,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
- Roth, Alvin E & Murnighan, J Keith & Schoumaker, Francoise, 1988. "The Deadline Effect in Bargaining: Some Experimental Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 806-23, September.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:esi:discus:2001-01. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Karin Richter)The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Karin Richter to update the entry or send us the correct address
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.