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A Formal Basis for Negotiation Support System Research

Author

Listed:
  • Clyde W. Holsapple

    (University of Kentucky)

  • Hsiangchu Lai

    (National Sun Yat-sen University)

  • Andrew B. Whinston

    (The University of Texas at Austin)

Abstract

A high-level theoretical model of negotiation activity is introduced as a foundation for guiding future research and development in the area of negotiation support literature. A formal model at this level is presently absent from the negotiation support systems. The model is formally expressed in terms of definitions and postulates that describe eight important negotiation parameters. Relationships between the model and research in game theory, social behavior science, and decision support systems fields are examined.

Suggested Citation

  • Clyde W. Holsapple & Hsiangchu Lai & Andrew B. Whinston, 1998. "A Formal Basis for Negotiation Support System Research," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 203-227, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:grdene:v:7:y:1998:i:3:d:10.1023_a:1008679331142
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1008679331142
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1985. "A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information about Time Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1151-1172, September.
    3. Roger B. Myerson, 1984. "An Introduction to Game Theory," Discussion Papers 623, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    4. Bonczek, Robert H. & Holsapple, Clyde W. & Whinston, Andrew B., 1981. "Foundations of Decision Support Systems," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 1, number 9780121130503 edited by Schmidt, J. William.
    5. Clyde Holsapple & Hsiangchu Lai & Andrew Whinston, 1997. "Implications of Negotiation Theory for Research and Development of Negotiation Support Systems," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 255-274, May.
    6. Jarke, Matthias & Jelassi, M. Tawfik & Shakun, Melvin F., 1987. ": Towards a negotiation support system," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 314-334, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gregory E. Kersten, 2001. "Modeling Distributive and Integrative Negotiations. Review and Revised Characterization," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 10(6), pages 493-514, November.
    2. Calosso, T. & Cantamessa, M. & Vu, Dang & Villa, A., 2003. "Production planning and order acceptance in business to business electronic commerce," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 233-249, August.

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