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Optimal bilateral trade of multiple objects

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  • Eilat, Ran
  • Pauzner, Ady

Abstract

We study a private-values buyer-seller problem with multiple objects. Valuations are binary and i.i.d. We construct mechanisms that span the set of all Pareto-efficient outcomes. The induced trading rules for objects are linked in a simple way.

Suggested Citation

  • Eilat, Ran & Pauzner, Ady, 2011. "Optimal bilateral trade of multiple objects," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 503-512, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:71:y:2011:i:2:p:503-512
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    References listed on IDEAS

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