Mechanism design with maxmin agents: theory and an application to bilateral trade
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- repec:eee:jetheo:v:171:y:2017:i:c:p:64-100 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:eee:jetheo:v:176:y:2018:i:c:p:693-726 is not listed on IDEAS
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- Kneeland, Terri, 2017. "Mechanism design with level-k types: Theory and an application to bilateral trade," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change SP II 2017-303, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
- Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2018. "A Very Robust Auction Mechanism," PIER Working Paper Archive 18-001, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 16 Jan 2018.
More about this item
KeywordsMechanism design; maxmin; ambiguity aversion; bilateral trade; Myerson-Satterthwaite;
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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