Transfers in Kind: Why They Can Be Efficient and Nonpaternalistic
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Volume (Year): 81 (1991)
Issue (Month): 5 (December)
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- Nichols, Albert L & Zeckhauser, Richard J, 1982. "Targeting Transfers through Restrictions on Recipients," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(2), pages 372-377, May.
- Neil Bruce & Michael Waldman, 1986.
"The Rotten-Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan's Dilemma,"
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- Neil Bruce & Michael Waldman, 1990. "The Rotten-Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan's Dilemma," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 105(1), pages 155-165.
- Neil Bruce & Michael Waldman, 1986. "The Rotten-Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan's Dilemma," UCLA Economics Working Papers 402, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Blackorby, Charles & Donaldson, David, 1988. "Cash versus Kind, Self-selection, and Efficient Transfers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 691-700, September.
- Dye, Ronald A. & Antle, Rick, 1986. "Cost-minimizing welfare programs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 259-265, July.
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