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Conditional Cash Transfers, Public Provision of Private Goods, and Income Redistribution

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  • Firouz Gahvari
  • Enlinson Mattos

Abstract

This paper examines the role of cash transfers as a screening device when combined with in-kind transfers. It shows that linking in-kind to cash transfers makes first-best redistribution possible despite the government's inability to tell rich and poor individuals apart. Moreover, the maximal attainable welfare for the poor can be pushed beyond its first-best level by distorting downward the quality of the indivisible good the poor receive relative to the cash value of their net transfers. Using in-kind transfers alone, as in Besley and Coate (1991), leads to a third-best solution. (JEL D31, H23, H41)

Suggested Citation

  • Firouz Gahvari & Enlinson Mattos, 2007. "Conditional Cash Transfers, Public Provision of Private Goods, and Income Redistribution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 491-502, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:97:y:2007:i:1:p:491-502
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.1.491
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gahvari, Firouz, 1994. "In-kind transfers, cash grants and labor supply," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 495-504, November.
    2. Gahvari, Firouz, 1995. "In-Kind versus Cash Transfers in the Presence of Distortionary Taxes," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 33(1), pages 45-53, January.
    3. Bourguignon, Francois & Ferreira, Francisco H. G. & Leite, Phillippe G., 2002. "Ex-ante evaluation of conditional cash transfer programs: the case of bolsa escola," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2916, The World Bank.
    4. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1991. "Public Provision of Private Goods and the Redistribution of Income," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 979-984, September.
    5. Nichols, Albert L & Zeckhauser, Richard J, 1982. "Targeting Transfers through Restrictions on Recipients," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(2), pages 372-377, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2014. "Toward an efficiency rationale for the public provision of private goods," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(2), pages 375-408, June.
    2. Paul A. Raschky & Manijeh Schwindt, 2009. "On the Channel and Type of International Disaster Aid," Working Papers 2009-16, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
    3. Silva,Joana C. G. & Morgandi,Matteo & Levin,Victoria, 2016. "Trust in government and support for redistribution," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7675, The World Bank.
    4. Sofia N. Andreou & Panos Pashardes & Nicoletta Pashourtidou, 2015. "The value of state education to consumers," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 05-2015, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
    5. Harounan Kazianga & Damien de Walque & Harold Alderman, 2009. "Educational and Health Impacts of Two School Feeding Schemes: Evidence from a Randomized Trial in Rural Burkina Faso," Economics Working Paper Series 0904, Oklahoma State University, Department of Economics and Legal Studies in Business.
    6. Mattos, Enlinson & Terra, Rafael, 2016. "Cash-cum-in-kind transfers and income tax function," Textos para discussão 414, FGV/EESP - Escola de Economia de São Paulo, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
    7. Janet Currie & Firouz Gahvari, 2008. "Transfers in Cash and In-Kind: Theory Meets the Data," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(2), pages 333-383, June.
    8. Enlinson Mattos, 2007. "Cash-Cum-In-Kind Transfers, Tax Rates And Labor Supply: Qualifying The Record," Anais do XXXV Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 35th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 020, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    9. Earl L. Grinols & Peri Silva, 2012. "Intervention Efficiency, Incentive Symmetry, and Information," Development Working Papers 334, Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, University of Milano, revised 16 Jul 2012.
    10. Paul A. Raschky & Manijeh Schwindt, 2016. "Aid, Catastrophes and the Samaritan's Dilemma," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 83(332), pages 624-645, October.
    11. Parkash Chander, 2016. "Public Provision Of Private Goods In Developing Countries," The Singapore Economic Review (SER), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 61(03), pages 1-13, June.
    12. Flavio Marques & Simone Covre & Enlinson Mattos, 2008. "Oferta de trabalho e transferências: Evidências do efeito das condições impostas pelo programa Bolsa-Família," Anais do XXXVI Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 36th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 200807141223420, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    13. Francesco Andreoli & Giorgia Casalone & Daniela Sonedda, 2015. "An empirical assessment of households sorting into private schooling under public education provision," Working Papers 356, ECINEQ, Society for the Study of Economic Inequality.
    14. Enlinson Mattos & Vitor França, 2011. "Public employment and income redistribution: causal evidence for Brazilian municipalities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 146(1), pages 43-73, January.
    15. Spencer Bastani & Sören Blomquist & Luca Micheletto, 2017. "Child Care Subsidies, Quality, and Optimal Income Taxation," CESifo Working Paper Series 6533, CESifo Group Munich.
    16. Leonardo Bursztyn & Lucas C. Coffman, 2012. "The Schooling Decision: Family Preferences, Intergenerational Conflict, and Moral Hazard in the Brazilian Favelas," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(3), pages 359-397.
    17. Del Rey, Elena & Estevan, Fernanda, 2013. "Conditional cash transfers and education quality in the presence of credit constraints," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 76-84.
    18. J. Amegashie & Bazoumana Ouattara & Eric Strobl, 2013. "Moral hazard and the composition of transfers: theory and evidence from cross-border transfers," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 279-301, August.
    19. Yui Nakamura, 2016. "Efficient Income Redistribution under Asymmetric Information," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 36(1), pages 388-394.
    20. Stephane Hallegatte & Mook Bangalore & Laura Bonzanigo & Marianne Fay & Tamaro Kane & Ulf Narloch & Julie Rozenberg & David Treguer & Adrien Vogt-Schilb, 2016. "Shock Waves," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 22787.
    21. Armando Barrientos & Juan Miguel Villa, 2013. "Antipoverty transfers and labour force participation effects," Global Development Institute Working Paper Series 18513, GDI, The University of Manchester.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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