Social Insurance with In-Kind Provision of Private Goods
This paper addresses the desirability of providing in-kind transfers as a screening device to facilitate redistribution of income from able to disabled persons within a social insurance system. An optimal policy--consisting of cash transfers, income-contingent in-kind transfers of one good particularly demanded by disabled workers, and linear taxation of other commodities--is characterized. It is then asked whether and, if so, when this policy can be replaced by an "earning-tested scheme" that provides the in-kind good only to those individuals who have no earnings from labor or by a non-linear pricing policy. Copyright 2001 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
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Volume (Year): 103 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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