Optimal Taxes and Transfers under Partial Information
Effective from 2005, benefits for long-term unemployed have been reduced in Germany to the level of social assistance. This measure reflects the view that “all who are able to work, should work” - a view which makes sense only if the government can distinguish the disabled from the productive. In this paper we augment the standard model of optimal taxation, where the government has no information about individual productivities, by this very assumption: Partial information means that the government can distinguish the disabled from the productive, but cannot distinguish among the different productive types. An interesting proposition about the shape of optimal tax-transfer schemes under partial information is derived. Moreover, it is shown that unemployment on the side of the productive poor may still be optimal.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 225 (2005)
Issue (Month): 6 (December)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://www.degruyter.com|
|Order Information:||Web: https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/jbnst|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Chambers, Robert G., 1989. "Workfare or welfare?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 79-97, October.
- J. A. Mirrlees, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(2), pages 175-208.
- Immonen, Ritva, et al, 1998. "Tagging and Taxing: The Optimal Use of Categorical and Income Information in Designing Tax/Transfer Schemes," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 65(258), pages 179-192, May.
- Seade, J. K., 1977. "On the shape of optimal tax schedules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 203-235, April.
- Tuomala, Matti, 1990. "Optimal Income Tax and Redistribution," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198286059.
- Homburg, Stefan, 2002. "Optimal Marginal Tax Rates for Low Incomes: Positive, Negative, or Zero?," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-255, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
- Katherine Cuff, 2000.
"Optimality of workfare with heterogeneous preferences,"
Canadian Journal of Economics,
Canadian Economics Association, vol. 33(1), pages 149-174, February.
- Katherine Cuff, 1998. "Optimality of Workfare with Heterogeneous Preferences," Working Papers 968, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Emmanuel Saez, 2002. "Optimal Income Transfer Programs: Intensive versus Extensive Labor Supply Responses," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 117(3), pages 1039-1073.
- Emmanuel Saez, 2000. "Optimal Income Transfer Programs: Intensive Versus Extensive Labor Supply Responses," NBER Working Papers 7708, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Homburg, Stefan, 2010. "Allgemeine Steuerlehre," EconStor Books, ZBW - German National Library of Economics, number 92547, June.
- Stefan Homburg, 2001. "The Optimal Income Tax: Restatement and Extensions," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 58(4), pages 363-395, November.
- Homburg, Stefan, 2002. "The Optimal Income Tax: Restatement and Extensions," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-252, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
- Boadway, Robin & Marceau, Nicolas & Sato, Motohiro, 1999. "Agency and the design of welfare systems," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 1-30, July.
- Homburg, Stefan, 1998. "An Axiomatic Proof of Mirrlees' Formula," EconStor Open Access Articles, ZBW - German National Library of Economics, pages 285-295.
- Homburg, Stefan, 1998. "An Axiomatic Proof of Mirrlees' Formula," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 53(3-4), pages 285-295.
- Diamond, P., 1980. "Income taxation with fixed hours of work," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 101-110, February.
- Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 1995. "The Design of Income Maintenance Programmes," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 62(2), pages 187-221.
- Besley, T. & Coate, S., 1991. "The Design Of Income Maintenance Programs," Papers 74, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - John M. Olin Program.
- Ritva Immonen & Kanbur, Kanbur & Michael Keen & Matti Tuomola, 1994. "Tagging and taxing: the optimal use of categorical and income information in designing tax/transfer schemes," IFS Working Papers W94/05, Institute for Fiscal Studies. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:jns:jbstat:v:225:y:2005:i:6:p:622-629. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Peter Golla)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.