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Optimal taxation in the extensive model

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  • Phillippe Choné

    (Institute for Fiscal Studies)

  • Guy Laroque

    () (Institute for Fiscal Studies)

Abstract

We study optimal taxation in the general extensive model: the only decision of the participants in the economy is to choose between working (full time) or staying inactive. People differ in their productivities and in other features which determine their work opportunity costs. The qualitative properties of optimal tax schemes are presented, with an emphasis on the role of heterogeneity in the equity-efficiency tradeoff. When the government has a redistributive stance, there are a number of cases where the low skilled workers face larger financial incentives to work than in the laissez-faire (negative average tax rates). In particular, this occurs whenever the social weights vary continuously with income and the social weight assigned to the less skilled workers is larger than average.

Suggested Citation

  • Phillippe Choné & Guy Laroque, 2008. "Optimal taxation in the extensive model," IFS Working Papers W08/08, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  • Handle: RePEc:ifs:ifsewp:08/08
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Jacquet, Laurence & Lehmann, Etienne & Van der Linden, Bruno, 2013. "Optimal redistributive taxation with both extensive and intensive responses," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 1770-1805.
    2. Kory Kroft & Kucko Kavan & Etienne Lehmann & Johannes Schmieder, 2015. "Optimal Income Taxation with Unemployment and Wage Responses: A Sufficient Statistics Approach," Working Papers hal-01292126, HAL.
    3. Craig Brett & Laurence Jacquet, 2015. "Workforce or workfare? The optimal use of work requirements when labour is supplied along the extensive margin," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 48(5), pages 1855-1882, December.
    4. Normann Lorenz & Dominik Sachs, 2011. "Optimal Nonlinear Taxation, Minimum Hours, and the Earned Income Tax Credit," Research Papers in Economics 2011-11, University of Trier, Department of Economics.
    5. Marios Karabarbounis, 2012. "Heterogeneity in Labor Supply Elasticity and Optimal Taxation," 2012 Meeting Papers 655, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    6. repec:bla:scandj:v:119:y:2017:i:4:p:910-938 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Laurence JACQUET & Etienne LEHMANN & Bruno VAN DER LINDEN, 2012. "Signing distortions in optimal tax and other adverse selection problems with random participation," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 2012003, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    8. Jacquet, Laurence & Lehmann, Etienne & Van der Linden, Bruno, 2011. "Optimal Redistributive Taxation with Both Labor Supply and Labor Demand Responses," IZA Discussion Papers 5642, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    9. Robin Boadway & Zhen Song & Jean-Francois Tremblay, 2013. "Optimal Income Taxation and Job Choice," CEMA Working Papers 599, China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics.
    10. Lehmann, Etienne & Parmentier, Alexis & Van Der Linden, Bruno, 2011. "Optimal income taxation with endogenous participation and search unemployment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 1523-1537.
    11. Jacquet, Laurence & Lehmann, Etienne & Van der Linden, Bruno, 2011. "Optimal Redistributive Taxation with Both Labor Supply and Labor Demand Responses," IZA Discussion Papers 5642, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    12. FitzRoy, Felix & Jin, Jim, 2011. "Efficient redistribution: Comparing basic income with unemployment benefit," HWWI Research Papers 107, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI).
    13. Brett, Craig & Jacquet, Laurence, 2011. "Workforce or Workfare?," Discussion Paper Series in Economics 8/2011, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics.
    14. Laurence Jacquet & Etienne Lehmann & Bruno Linden, 2014. "Optimal income taxation with Kalai wage bargaining and endogenous participation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(2), pages 381-402, February.
    15. Michau, Jean-Baptiste, 2014. "Optimal redistribution: A life-cycle perspective," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 1-16.
    16. Findeisen, Sebastian & Sachs, Dominik, 2016. "Education and optimal dynamic taxation: The role of income-contingent student loans," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 1-21.
    17. Jean-Baptiste Michau, 2011. "Optimal Redistribution with Intensive and Extensive Labor Supply Margins: A Life-Cycle Perspective," Working Papers hal-00639121, HAL.
    18. Brigitte Baalen & Tobias Müller, 2014. "Social welfare effects of tax-benefit reform under endogenous participation and unemployment: an ordinal approach," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 21(2), pages 198-227, April.
    19. Bierbrauer Felix J., 2016. "Effizienz oder Gerechtigkeit?," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 17(1), pages 2-24, April.
    20. Felix FitzRoy & Jim Jin, 2015. "A Basic Income Can Raise Employment and Welfare for a Majority," Discussion Paper Series, Department of Economics 201508, Department of Economics, University of St. Andrews.
    21. Kavan Kucko & Johannes Schmieder & Etienne Lehmann & Kory Kroft, 2015. "Optimal Income Taxation under Unemployment: A Sufficient Statistics Approach," 2015 Meeting Papers 680, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    22. Felix Bierbrauer, 2016. "Effizienz oder Gerechtigkeit? Ungleiche Einkommen, ungleiche Vermögen und die Theorie der optimalen Besteuerung," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2016_03, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household

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