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The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program

In: Means-Tested Transfer Programs in the United States

  • Robert A. Moffitt

The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program was created in 1996 from what was previously named the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program The TANF program is intended to serve low-income families primarily those with only a single parent present as did the AFDC program The TANF program is distinguished from AFDC by strong work requirements time limits on receipt options for the provision of noncash assistance and by a block grant financing structure This paper reviews the rules of the TANF program and the research that has been conducted on it and on the AFDC program

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This chapter was published in:
  • Robert A. Moffitt, 2003. "Means-Tested Transfer Programs in the United States," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number moff03-1, September.
  • This item is provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Chapters with number 10258.
    Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:10258
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