Health insurance, cost expectations, and adverse job turnover
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- Randall P. Ellis & Ching-to Albert Ma, 2007. "Health Insurance, Cost Expectations, and Adverse Job Turnover," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2007-034, Boston University - Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Chu-Shiu Li & Chwen-Chi Liu & Yu-Chen Kuo & Chen-Sheng Yang, 2013. "Health insurance provision and labor contracts for small firms," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 325-334, February.
- Phillip B. Levine & Robin McKnight & Samantha Heep, 2009. "Public Policy, Health Insurance and the Transition to Adulthood," NBER Working Papers 15114, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Keywordshealth insurance ; job turnover ; adverse selection ;
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