Theorie und Praxis des Risikostrukturausgleichs
This article reviews the basic theoretical model of risk adjustment (Glazer/McGuire 2000) with a special focus on a coherent presentation of the main results. With adverse selection a regulator pursuing efficiency and solidarity objectives will need a risk adjustment scheme acting on a signal to accomplish both aims. With an imperfect signal this result will not hold. The regulator can react by trying to find more informative signals or by changing the calculation of the risk adjustment scheme (optimal risk adjustment). The model is then extended to derive results on the associated incentives regarding economic efficiency, manipulation of signals and innovation. The incentives will hold with perfect signals but may be violated in the imperfect signal setting. Optimal risk adjustment will most likely have a negative effect on these incentives. The results are contrasted with the empirical literature on the risk adjustment procedure in Germany which is centred on risk selection, the choice of risk adjustors and incentive effects. The paper concludes with an outlook on the ongoing reform of the German risk adjustment procedure.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 227 (2007)
Issue (Month): 5+6 (December)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +49 (0)641 99 22 001
Fax: +49 (0)641 99 22 009
Web page: http://wiwi.uni-giessen.de/home/oekonometrie/Jahrbuecher/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Shen, Yujing & Ellis, Randall P., 2002.
"Cost-minimizing risk adjustment,"
Journal of Health Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 515-530, May.
- Randall P. Ellis & Thomas G. McGuire, 2006.
"Predictability and Predictiveness in Health Care Spending,"
Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series
WP2006-001, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Ellis, Randall P. & McGuire, Thomas G., 2007. "Predictability and predictiveness in health care spending," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 25-48, January.
- Jack, William, 2006. "Optimal risk adjustment with adverse selection and spatial competition," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 908-926, September.
- Glazer, Jacob & McGuire, Thomas G., 2002. "Setting health plan premiums to ensure efficient quality in health care: minimum variance optimal risk adjustment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 153-173, May.
- Thomas G. McGuire & Jacob Glazer, 2000. "Optimal Risk Adjustment in Markets with Adverse Selection: An Application to Managed Care," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 1055-1071, September.
- Jacob Glazer & Thomas G. McGuire, 2006. "Contending with Risk Selection in Health Insurance Markets in Germany," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 7(s1), pages 75-91, 05.
- Corinne Behrend & Florian Buchner & Michael Happich & Rolf Holle & Peter Reitmeir & Jürgen Wasem, 2007.
"Risk-adjusted capitation payments: how well do principal inpatient diagnosis-based models work in the German situation? Results from a large data set,"
The European Journal of Health Economics,
Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 31-39, March.
- Behrend, Corinne & Buchner, Florian & Happich, Michael & Holle, Rolf & Reitmeir, Peter & Wasem, Jürgen, 2004. "Risk-Adjusted Capitation Payments: How Well Do Principal Inpatient Diagnosis-Based Models Work in the German Situation? Results From a Large Data Set," IBES Diskussionsbeiträge 134, University of Duisburg-Essen, Institute of Business and Economic Studie (IBES).
- Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
- Robert Nuscheler & Thomas Knaus, 2005. "Risk selection in the German public health insurance system," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(12), pages 1253-1271.
- Frank, Richard G. & Glazer, Jacob & McGuire, Thomas G., 2000. "Measuring adverse selection in managed health care," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(6), pages 829-854, November.
- Arlene Ash & Randall P. Ellis & Gregory Pope & John Ayanian & David Bates & Helen Burstin & Lisa Iezzoni & Elizabeth McKay & Wei Yu, 2000. "Using Diagnoses to Describe Populations and Predict Costs," Papers 0099, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Peter Zweifel, 2006. "Auftrag und Grenzen der Sozialen Krankenversicherung," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 7(s1), pages 5-26, 05.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:jns:jbstat:v:227:y:2007:i:5-6:p:485-501. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Peter Winker)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.