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Optimal risk adjustment with adverse selection and spatial competition

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  • Jack, William

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  • Jack, William, 2006. "Optimal risk adjustment with adverse selection and spatial competition," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 908-926, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:25:y:2006:i:5:p:908-926
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Biglaiser, Gary & Ma, Ching-to Albert, 2003. " Price and Quality Competition under Adverse Selection: Market Organization and Efficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(2), pages 266-286, Summer.
    2. Jack, William, 2001. "Controlling selection incentives when health insurance contracts are endogenous," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 25-48, April.
    3. Shen, Yujing & Ellis, Randall P., 2002. "Cost-minimizing risk adjustment," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 515-530, May.
    4. Glazer, Jacob & McGuire, Thomas G., 2002. "Setting health plan premiums to ensure efficient quality in health care: minimum variance optimal risk adjustment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 153-173, May.
    5. Steven C. Salop, 1979. "Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 141-156, Spring.
    6. Jack, W., 1998. "Controlling Risk Selction Incentives when Health Insurance Contracts are Endogenous," Papers 341, Australian National University - Department of Economics.
    7. Van de ven, Wynand P.M.M. & Ellis, Randall P., 2000. "Risk adjustment in competitive health plan markets," Handbook of Health Economics,in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 14, pages 755-845 Elsevier.
    8. Frank, Richard G. & Glazer, Jacob & McGuire, Thomas G., 2000. "Measuring adverse selection in managed health care," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(6), pages 829-854, November.
    9. Olivella, Pau & Vera-Hernandez, Marcos, 2007. "Competition among differentiated health plans under adverse selection," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 233-250, March.
    10. Joseph P. Newhouse, 1996. "Reimbursing Health Plans and Health Providers: Efficiency in Production versus Selection," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(3), pages 1236-1263, September.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Normann Lorenz, 2013. "Adverse selection and risk adjustment under imperfect competition," Research Papers in Economics 2013-05, University of Trier, Department of Economics.
    2. Normann Lorenz, 2014. "Using quantile regression for optimal risk adjustment," Research Papers in Economics 2014-11, University of Trier, Department of Economics.
    3. Rachel Kreier & Bhaswati Sengupta, 2015. "Income, Health, and the Value of Preserving Options," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 43(4), pages 431-448, December.
    4. Daniel McFadden & Carlos Noton & Pau Olivella, 2015. "Minimum coverage regulation in insurance markets," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 6(3), pages 247-278, August.
    5. R. C. Kleef & R. C. J. A. Vliet & W. P. M. M. Ven, 2016. "Overpaying morbidity adjusters in risk equalization models," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 17(7), pages 885-895, September.
    6. Normann Lorenz, 2014. "The interaction of direct and indirect risk selection," Research Papers in Economics 2014-12, University of Trier, Department of Economics.
    7. Okura Mahito, 2010. "An Equilibrium Analysis of the Insurance Market with Horizontal Differentiation," Asia-Pacific Journal of Risk and Insurance, De Gruyter, vol. 4(2), pages 1-24, July.
    8. Olivella, Pau & Vera-Hernandez, Marcos, 2007. "Competition among differentiated health plans under adverse selection," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 233-250, March.
    9. Michiel Bijlsma & Jan Boone & Gijsbert Zwart, 2014. "Competition leverage: how the demand side affects optimal risk adjustment," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(4), pages 792-815, December.
    10. Lorenz, Normann, 2015. "The interaction of direct and indirect risk selection," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 81-89.
    11. Tsuyoshi Takahara, 2016. "Patient dumping, outlier payments, and optimal healthcare payment policy under asymmetric information," Health Economics Review, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 1-11, December.
    12. Normann Lorenz, 2014. "Adverse selection and heterogeneity of demand responsiveness," Research Papers in Economics 2014-02, University of Trier, Department of Economics.
    13. repec:dpr:wpaper:0891 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Glazer, Jacob & McGuire, Thomas G., 2011. "Gold and Silver health plans: Accommodating demand heterogeneity in managed competition," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 1011-1019.
    15. Göpffarth Dirk, 2007. "Theorie und Praxis des Risikostrukturausgleichs / Risk Adjustment in Theory and Practice," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 227(5-6), pages 485-501, October.

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