Optimal cost reimbursement of health insurers to reduce risk selection
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- Kifmann, Mathias & Lorenz, Normann, 2005. "Optimal cost reimbursement of health insurers to reduce risk selection," Discussion Papers, Series I 329, University of Konstanz, Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Geruso, Michael & McGuire, Thomas G., 2016.
"Tradeoffs in the design of health plan payment systems: Fit, power and balance,"
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Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 1-19.
- Michael Geruso & Thomas G. McGuire, 2014. "Tradeoffs in the Design of Health Plan Payment Systems: Fit, Power and Balance," NBER Working Papers 20359, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bijlsma, M. & Boone, Jan & Zwart, G.T.J., 2015.
"Community Rating in Health Insurance : Trade-Off Between Coverage and Selection,"
2015-022, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
- Bijlsma, M. & Boone, Jan & Zwart, G.T.J., 2015. "Community Rating in Health Insurance : Trade-Off Between Coverage and Selection," Discussion Paper 2015-053, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Bijlsma, Michiel & Boone, Jan & Zwart, Gijsbert, 2015. "Community rating in health insurance: trade-off between coverage and selection," CEPR Discussion Papers 10943, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Colleen Carey, 2017. "Technological Change and Risk Adjustment: Benefit Design Incentives in Medicare Part D," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 38-73, February.
- Mathias Kifmann & Normann Lorenz, 2004. "Der optimale "Risikopool" zur Vermeidung von Risikoselektion," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 73(4), pages 539-554.
- Martina Grunow & Robert Nuscheler, 2014.
"Public And Private Health Insurance In Germany: The Ignored Risk Selection Problem,"
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(6), pages 670-687, June.
- Martina Grunow & Robert Nuscheler, 2010. "Public and Private Health Insurance in Germany: The Ignored Risk Selection Problem," Working Papers 093, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE).
- Martina Grunow & Robert Nuscheler, 2010. "Public and Private Health Insurance in Germany: The Ignored Risk Selection Problem," Discussion Paper Series 312, Universitaet Augsburg, Institute for Economics.
More about this item
Keywordshealth insurance ; risk selection ; cost reimbursement ; risk adjustment ;
- H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
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