Public and Private Health Insurance in Germany: The Ignored Risk Selection Problem
While risk selection within the German public health insurance system has received considerable attention, risk selection between public and private health insurers has largely been ignored. This is surprising since – given the institutional structure – risk selection between systems is likely to be more pronounced. We find clear evidence for risk selection in favor of private insurers. While private insurers are unable to select the healthy upon enrollment they manage to dump high risk individuals who then end up in the public system. This gives private insurers an unjustified competitive advantage vis-à-vis public insurer. A risk adjusted compensation would mitigate this advantage.
|Date of creation:||Aug 2010|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Universitaetsstrasse 16, D-86159 Augsburg, Germany|
Phone: +49 821 598 4060
Fax: +49 821 598 4217
Web page: http://www.wiwi.uni-augsburg.de/vwl/institut
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Neil J. Buckley & Katherine Cuff & Jeremiah Hurley & Logan McLeod & Robert Nuscheler & David Cameron, 2012.
"Willingness-to-pay for parallel private health insurance: evidence from a laboratory experiment,"
Canadian Journal of Economics,
Canadian Economics Association, vol. 45(1), pages 137-166, February.
- Neil Buckley & Katherine Cuff & Jeremiah Hurley & Logan McLeod & Robert Nuscheler & David Cameron, 2010. "Willingness-to-Pay for Parallel Private Health Insurance: Evidence from Laboratory Experiment," Centre for Health Economics and Policy Analysis Working Paper Series 2010-02, Centre for Health Economics and Policy Analysis (CHEPA), McMaster University, Hamilton, Canada.
- Sean Nicholson & Kate Bundorf & Rebecca M. Stein & Daniel Polsky, 2003. "The Magnitude and Nature of Risk Selection in Employer-Sponsored Health Plans," NBER Working Papers 9937, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Van de ven, Wynand P.M.M. & Ellis, Randall P., 2000. "Risk adjustment in competitive health plan markets," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 14, pages 755-845 Elsevier.
- Gert G. Wagner & Joachim R. Frick & Jürgen Schupp, 2007.
"The German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) – Scope, Evolution and Enhancements,"
Schmollers Jahrbuch : Journal of Applied Social Science Studies / Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften,
Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, vol. 127(1), pages 139-169.
- Gert G. Wagner & Joachim R. Frick & Jürgen Schupp, 2007. "The German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP): Scope, Evolution and Enhancements," SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research 1, DIW Berlin, The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
- Buchner, Florian & Wasem, Jurgen, 2003. "Needs for further improvement: risk adjustment in the German health insurance system," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 21-35, July.
- Crossley, Thomas F. & Kennedy, Steven, 2002. "The reliability of self-assessed health status," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 643-658, July.
- Kifmann, Mathias & Lorenz, Normann, 2005.
"Optimal cost reimbursement of health insurers to reduce risk selection,"
Discussion Papers, Series I
329, University of Konstanz, Department of Economics.
- Mathias Kifmann & Normann Lorenz, 2011. "Optimal cost reimbursement of health insurers to reduce risk selection," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(5), pages 532-552, May.
- Doorslaer, Eddy van & Jones, Andrew M., 2003. "Inequalities in self-reported health: validation of a new approach to measurement," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 61-87, January.
- Robert Nuscheler & Thomas Knaus, 2005. "Risk selection in the German public health insurance system," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(12), pages 1253-1271.
- David M. Cutler & Sarah J. Reber, 1998. "Paying for Health Insurance: The Trade-Off between Competition and Adverse Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 113(2), pages 433-466.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aug:augsbe:0312. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dr. Albrecht Bossert)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.