Tradeoffs in the Design of Health Plan Payment Systems: Fit, Power and Balance
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- Geruso, Michael & McGuire, Thomas G., 2016. "Tradeoffs in the design of health plan payment systems: Fit, power and balance," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 1-19.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Joseph P. Newhouse & Mary Beth Landrum & Mary Price & J. Michael McWilliams & John Hsu & Thomas G. McGuire, 2019. "The Comparative Advantage of Medicare Advantage," American Journal of Health Economics, MIT Press, vol. 5(2), pages 281-301, Spring.
- Joseph P. Newhouse & Mary Beth Landrum & Mary Price & J. Michael McWilliams & John Hsu & Thomas McGuire, 2018. "The Comparative Advantage of Medicare Advantage," NBER Working Papers 24289, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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- Adam Pilny & Ansgar Wübker & Nicolas R. Ziebarth, 2017. "Introducing Risk Adjustment and Free Health Plan Choice in Employer-Based Health Insurance: Evidence from Germany," SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research 915, DIW Berlin, The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
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- Keith M. Marzilli Ericson & Kimberley H. Geissler & Benjamin Lubin, 2018. "The Impact of Partial-Year Enrollment on the Accuracy of Risk-Adjustment Systems: A Framework and Evidence," American Journal of Health Economics, MIT Press, vol. 4(4), pages 454-478, Fall.
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- Benjamin R. Handel & Jonathan T. Kolstad & Johannes Spinnewijn, 2015. "Information Frictions and Adverse Selection: Policy Interventions in Health Insurance Markets," CEP Discussion Papers dp1390, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Handel, Benjamin R. & Kolstad, Jonathan T. & Spinnewijn, Johannes, 2018. "Information frictions and adverse selection: policy interventions in health insurance markets," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 87775, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Benjamin R. Handel & Jonathan T. Kolstad & Johannes Spinnewijn, 2015. "Information Frictions and Adverse Selection: Policy Interventions in Health Insurance Markets," CESifo Working Paper Series 5623, CESifo.
- Handel, Benjamin R. & Kolstad, Jonathan T. & Spinnewijn, Johannes, 2015. "Information frictions and adverse selection: policyinterventions in health insurance markets," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 65011, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Benjamin R. Handel & Jonathan T. Kolstad & Johannes Spinnewijn, 2015. "Information Frictions and Adverse Selection: Policy Interventions in Health Insurance Markets," NBER Working Papers 21759, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Handel, Benjamin R. & Kolstad, Jonathan & Spinnewijn, Johannes, 2015. "Information Frictions and Adverse Selection: Policy Interventions in Health Insurance Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 10953, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Schmid, Christian P.R. & Beck, Konstantin, 2016. "Re-insurance in the Swiss health insurance market: Fit, power, and balance," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 120(7), pages 848-855.
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"Upcoding: Evidence from Medicare on Squishy Risk Adjustment,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(3), pages 984-1026.
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"The Two Margin Problem in Insurance Markets,"
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- Thomas G. McGuire & Sonja Schillo & Richard C. van Kleef, 2018. "Reinsurance, Repayments, and Risk Adjustment in Individual Health Insurance: Germany, The Netherlands and the U.S. Marketplaces," NBER Working Papers 25374, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Timothy J. Layton & Thomas G. McGuire & Anna D. Sinaiko, 2016.
"Risk Corridors and Reinsurance in Health Insurance Marketplaces: Insurance for Insurers,"
American Journal of Health Economics,
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- Timothy J. Layton & Thomas G. McGuire & Anna D. Sinaiko, 2014. "Risk Corridors and Reinsurance in Health Insurance Marketplaces: Insurance for Insurers," NBER Working Papers 20515, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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- Yi Yao & Joan Schmit & Julie Shi, 2019. "Promoting sustainability for micro health insurance: a risk-adjusted subsidy approach for maternal healthcare service," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 44(3), pages 382-409, July.
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- Timothy J. Layton & Thomas G. McGuire, 2016. "Marketplace Plan Payment Options for Dealing with High-Cost Enrollees," NBER Working Papers 22519, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Timothy J. Layton & Randall P. Ellis & Thomas G. McGuire, 2015. "Assessing Incentives for Adverse Selection in Health Plan Payment Systems," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series wp2015-024, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Timothy J. Layton & Randall P. Ellis & Thomas G. McGuire, 2015. "Assessing Incentives for Adverse Selection in Health Plan Payment Systems," NBER Working Papers 21531, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Timothy J. Layton & Thomas G. McGuire & Anna D. Sinaiko, 2016. "Risk Corridors and Reinsurance in Health Insurance Marketplaces: Insurance for Insurers," American Journal of Health Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(1), pages 66-95, Winter.
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- Timothy J. Layton & Thomas G. McGuire & Anna D. Sinaiko, 2014. "Risk Corridors and Reinsurance in Health Insurance Marketplaces: Insurance for Insurers," NBER Working Papers 20515, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Thomas G. McGuire & Anna L. Zink & Sherri Rose, 2020. "Simplifying and Improving the Performance of Risk Adjustment Systems," NBER Working Papers 26736, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Michael Geruso & Timothy J. Layton, 2017. "Selection in Health Insurance Markets and Its Policy Remedies," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 31(4), pages 23-50, Fall.
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- Shuli Brammli-Greenberg & Jacob Glazer & Ruth Waitzberg, 2019. "Modest risk-sharing significantly reduces health plans’ incentives for service distortion," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 20(9), pages 1359-1374, December.
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- Zhang, Xue & Sweetman, Arthur, 2018. "Blended capitation and incentives: Fee codes inside and outside the capitated basket," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 16-29.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
- H51 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Health
- I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-HEA-2014-08-09 (Health Economics)
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